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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Seeking NATO Membership
The importance of debates on whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization‟s
membership is in the interests of Ukraine continues since the independence of Ukraine
was declared and the country was pressured to become a non-nuclear state actor.
Regardless of the well-established dialogue and close cooperation between NATO and
Ukraine that were launched in 1991, “not a single election platform of any of Ukraine‟s
political party or presidential candidate has ever declared NATO membership to be its or
his/her goal” during the period of Ukraine‟s existence.1 Even the former pro-Western
president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, did not mention Ukraine‟s NATO aspirations
in his 2004 presidential election program.2 The case for Ukraine‟s admission to NATO
notwithstanding, Yushchenko‟s intention was not on the government‟s immediate
agenda. At least initially, it appeared that the Orange leader had played his game wisely
and had given much more emphasis to the goal of the European Union.
By the time of Mr. Yushchenko‟s inauguration, Ukraine‟s foreign policy was
consciously directed at maintaining its neutrality and at pursuing the gradual integration
into European institutions. In view of Ukraine‟s geostrategic position, the first two
presidents of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, considered it in the
interests of Ukraine to follow a multi-vector foreign policy as the country was still trying
to get out from under the Russian influence. While successfully dealing with Russia and

1

American Institute in Ukraine, “NATO and Ukraine’s Politicians: Time for Political Accountability,”
http://www.aminuk.org/index.php?idmenu=12&idsubmenu=81&language=en (accessed August 17,
2009).
2
Ibid.

1

being very cautious about the issue of Ukraine‟s membership in a Western military
alliance, the Ukrainian political leadership was clear about the interest of Ukraine‟s
prospective membership in the European Community. Further, a firm conviction was that
increases in the standard of living of a nation's population could be reached through
reciprocally advantageous relations with Russia, Asia, Latin American countries, and
long-term cooperation with the Western World.3 To avoid aggravating relations with
Russia, under the leadership of the first two presidents, Ukrainian diplomats stood firm in
their demand to transform NATO from “collective defense organization into collective
security organization, which would include Ukraine and Russia.”4 Considering the fact
that the EU and NATO approach to Ukraine has not functioned as a part of coordinated
Western policy, the question of whether to build the extensive all-European security
system was repeatedly discussed in the various political circles.
Having secured harmonious and friendly relations with Russia, during the
Yeltsin's presidency in the second half of the 1990s, distinct interest groups started to see
NATO membership as a stepping stone to membership in the EU. Furthermore, with
Putin‟s ascent to power, significant part of Ukrainian political elite made public
statements that Ukraine‟s neutrality is a temporary condition and Ukraine‟s incorporation
into NATO is a long term-goal for a country that found itself caught between “its desire
for stronger ties to the West and growing pressure”5 from the Russian Federation. In order
3

The concept of the “Western World” refers to the countries of Western and Central Europe, North
America, Australia, New Zealand and now Baltic states. These countries are capitalistic, democratic and
considered advanced. Very often the term “Western World” comes to be synonymous with the concept of
“First World” which is also constructed term around the economic, political and cultural values of
European/Western Civilization. In this context, several countries in Asia can be also considered as a part
of the “Western World.”
4
Stephen Larrabee, “Ukraine’s Balancing Act,” Survival 38, no.2 (Summer 1996):146.
5
Quoted in Ibid., 145.
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to avoid offending Russia and complicating Ukraine‟s security dilemma, the first two
presidents of Ukraine did not take any decisive policy action for NATO membership.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian politicians repeatedly stated that in case of deterioration of
Russia-Ukraine relations, Ukraine “would have no choice but to strive to join NATO.”6
Consequently, the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO permeates the entire
history of Ukraine as an independent state and has always depended not only on the
relations with Russia, but has been contingent on the interests of major political and
economic powers.
The 2004 presidential elections were momentous for Ukraine and the domestic
political conflict between two parts of the state entirely reflected a geopolitical struggle
between Russia and the Western World over the new Ukrainian state. With the wide scale
of Western and Russian interference in the 2004 Ukrainian elections, the fiasco of the
Moscow-backed candidate, in the 2004 presidential elections has been interpreted by
many in East and West as a loss for Russia and as the triumph of the United States in
Russia‟s backyard. The reaction of Russian politicians to this failure of Russia‟s plans for
Ukraine made clear that the Kremlin had underestimated the domestic political
environment in Ukraine. There were indications that Moscow would not accept loss of its
control and dominance over the post-Soviet space. The aggressive tone of the Russian
leadership certified that in Russia‟s foreign policy as well as in the Western world,
geopolitical interests are positioned much higher than essential political values.

6

Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine: NATO Relationship,” Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine,
April 14, 2000, http://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/stasiuk/st-articles/an-ukr-nat2.htm (accessed June 21,
2011).
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While there were no doubts about the corruption and fraud in the Ukrainian
presidential elections, there was clear evidence of the U.S. government supporting regime
change through support from the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House,
and private philanthropists such as George Soros to help the opposition and prodemocracy groups to overturn the government by using mass protests. Yushchenko‟s
electoral triumph had little to do with the development of the “civil-society,” but
replicated analogical Western interventions in Georgia, Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova or Serbia.7 It does not necessarily signify that people of Ukraine have chosen a
Western rather than Eastern path of the political and social development. Looking back, it
can be said that prior to Yushchenko‟s rise to power, the majority of the population of
Ukraine favored close relations with the Russian Federation, even at the expense of close
relations with the United States. The false choice between “authoritarian” Russia and the
“democratic” West, imposed on the people of Ukraine, was designed to shift the country
westward and launched a series of events aimed at bringing the post-Soviet country under
the West's increasing influence and domination.8
The Ukraine‟s so-called “Orange Revolution” in 2004 was crucial factor
influencing the Ukraine‟s foreign policy and consequently the process of Ukraine‟s
incorporation in Euro-Atlantic security arrangement.9 The newly-elected government of
the country of 46 million people demonstratively prioritized relations with the West over
Russia. The integration into the European Union, membership in the World Trade
Organization and the incorporation of Ukraine into the Western military apparatus have
7

Konstantin Kilibarda, “The Ukrainian elections: a dangerous fairy-tale,” The Kole’s Blog, entry posted
December 2, 2004, http://www.killingtrain.com/node/301 (accessed June 21, 2011).
8
Ibid.
9
Taras Kuzio, “Is Ukraine Part of Europe’s Future,” The Washington Quarterly 29, no.3 (Summer 2006):89.
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been selected and established as major foreign policy objectives. Three years after Victor
Yushchenko became president, with the strongly reiterated support of the United States,
Ukraine was approved for admission to the WTO. In terms of Ukraine‟s membership to
the EU, good progress has also been made. However, despite a great number of
significantly important agreements in numerous areas of cooperation, the EU has always
been sufficiently clear that it has no plans to offer Ukraine “membership for now and
instead would propose closer economic and political ties, including greater collaboration
on energy policy and a free trade agreement.”10
The implementation of the policy of aligning Ukraine with Europe and the United
States has undoubtedly damaged the relationship between Ukraine and Russia.
Specifically, Ukraine‟s strategic goal to join the European Union and NATO in
combination with its border and gas disputes with Russia, interpretation of Soviet-era
history, and the question of one of the Russia‟s biggest naval bases in Crimea has
substantially contributed to the deterioration in relations between the two post-Soviet
republics. Consequently, in a period of great political instability in Ukraine against the
background of the mutual political intimidation and blackmail between two neighboring
countries, the government of Ukraine found an opportunity to move from empty rhetoric
to concrete action, and finally took a decision to apply for NATO membership.
According to the perception of Ukraine‟s pro-NATO forces, Ukraine‟s
membership in Euro-Atlantic Alliance could significantly ensure the country‟s defense

10

Dan Bilefsky, “Ukraine to pursue EU entry,” New York Times, September 14, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/14/world/europe/14iht-ukraine.2811837.html (accessed September
10, 2009).
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against external pressure and consequently enhance the deteriorating security of the
country. In the judgments of Ukraine‟s analysts and intellectuals, membership in the
Euro-Atlantic security arrangement, based on the conception that no country
encountering a threat should be left to confront it alone, is the best guarantee to Ukraine‟s
independence and integrity.11 In January 2008, the Ukrainian government confronting the
low level of public support for joining the Western military organization sent an open
letter to NATO asking Ukraine to be considered for a Membership Action Plan.12
Although the official NATO position proclaims that Ukraine will become a full-fledged
member of the alliance, under the pressure from Russia and because of the internal
conditions of Ukraine, this has been postponed until an undecided future date.
B. Return to “Multi-Vector” Foreign Policy?
In the wake of Russia‟s invasion of Georgia, Ukraine‟s membership in Western
military alliance seemed inevitable. However, while the conflict between Russia and
Georgia was the precise reason for the United States and Eastern Europe to bring Ukraine
into NATO, Western European leaders felt that Russian invasion was legitimate and
insisted that further extension of NATO would provoke Russia and would make Kremlin
more aggressive. Therefore, major European powers‟ unwillingness to see Ukraine as

11

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 states that: “The Parties
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered
an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually
and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force,
to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed June 21, 2011).
12
Vladimir Socor, “Ukraine’s Top Three Leaders Request NATO Membership Action Plan,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor 5, no. 10 (2008), http://www.jamestown.org/si......x_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33304 (accessed
September 12, 2009).
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NATO ally derives from their reluctance to deteriorate relations with Russia on which
Western Europe is massively dependent for its supplies of energy resources. The truth is
that there are too many differences among the interests of NATO members and it would
not have been rational for the countries of Western Europe to jeopardize their own
economic and political position in order to get Ukraine into NATO. Clearly, the refusal
to grant Ukraine the Membership Action Plan at the ministerial meeting in December
2008, despite intense lobbying from former U.S. President, George H. W. Bush, indicated
the differences over the understanding of the nature of security and clearly demonstrated
a lack of a unified perception of threat. In sum, the costs of legitimacy of Ukraine‟s
incorporation into NATO have become too high which in its turn explains why the
expectations of Ukrainian government have not been fulfilled yet.
Besides, domestic political infighting and Ukrainian public opposition against
joining NATO has been a crucial obstacle for Ukraine to meet the necessary criteria for
NATO membership. Ukrainian society has always been divided on the issue of NATO
membership. In fact, while Western European leaders exhibit patience and are not willing
to antagonize Russia which views the expansion of NATO as a hostile action,
Yushchenko‟s push for NATO membership in the absence of public approval not only
engendered fears of a military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but further divided
Ukrainian society. In this context, the issue of NATO membership has served to
emphasize the political divisions of the post-Soviet country. Pro-NATO sentiments have
been widely present in the western and central part of Ukraine, whereas the strong
opposition to Ukrainian membership in NATO from the Russian-speaking east and south
of the Ukrainian state has only increased the complexity of the issue. In spite of the
7

numerous pro-NATO information campaigns launched by the government of Ukraine,
the majority of the population, being united in support of integration into the European
Union, has categorically objected to Ukraine‟s membership in Euro-Atlantic collective
defense pact. It is also important to mention that for the most part the opposition to
NATO among Ukrainians is formed by the stereotypes produced by the Soviet political
propaganda.
As Victor Yanukovych became a president in 2010, he dropped NATO
membership bid from Ukraine's agenda, insisting that Ukraine is not ready to join the
Atlantic Alliance and arguing that NATO conditions require the Ukrainian public to
claim ownership over the consensus of Ukrainian membership in the Alliance. From the
public rhetoric of Yanukovych after coming to power, it has become clear that the
president will not do anything for Ukraine`s Euro-Atlantic integration in the nearest
future and Ukraine is determined to pursue the policy of non-alignment as the central
guidance point in the security sphere. Specifically, several times Yanukovych
acknowledged that membership in NATO would be put to the Ukrainian electorate once
the country had gone through political and economic reforms.13 Practically speaking, the
question of the country's accession to the North-Atlantic Alliance, with Ukraine‟s eastern
and southern parts being more committed to good relations with Russia, had gone away
as quickly as it was raised after the Orange Revolution and Viktor Yushchenko's election.
Without doubt, Ukraine‟s adoption of non-aligned status is a great achievement.
First of all, abandoning Ukraine‟s drive towards the membership in Western military bloc

13

Dan Bilefsky, “Ukraine to pursue EU entry.”
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entirely represents the Ukrainian people‟s will. Secondly, Yanukovych's public position
on NATO signifies a wise move to repair the negative effect of the radical change in the
ethnic identity of Ukraine after the events of the Orange Revolution. Finally, the
Yanukovych‟s non-alignment strategy contributed not only to the stability of the country,
but has done a great deal to change the European security calculus. A neutral Ukraine
diminishes the risk of entrapping NATO members and Ukraine itself into military
confrontation with Russia. However, the only question is how long the leadership of
Ukraine will be able to coordinate policy between Russia and the West and
simultaneously play hard with the population of 46 million people.
C. The Construction of Consent or Simply a Role in “Reset”?
Although the current leadership of Ukraine overturned the previous government‟s
pro-NATO drive, the U.S. – led military alliance continues to be interested in Ukraine.
While Bush‟s administration was trying to draw Ukraine away from Russian influence by
encouraging it to join NATO at any cost, under the Obama administration, the idea of
Ukrainian membership in NATO has become attached to further deepening of relations
with the North-Atlantic Alliance and promotion of political, economic and military
reforms and at the same time maintaining good relations with Russia. In fact, since the
United States and NATO publicly welcomed Ukraine to the Alliance should the
government of Ukraine change its mind, it has become apparent that the West and
particularly the United States remains interested in the new government‟s undertaking of
economic reforms and its commitments to democracy. Concerns about Russia‟s
determination to use force to protect its geopolitical interests and Washington‟s ambition
to “reset” relations with Moscow led to the reformulation of U.S. foreign policy in the
9

region and thereby to an adjustment in its Ukraine policies. Undoubtedly, by publicly
suspending support for Ukrainian membership in NATO, after years of tensions, the
Obama administration succeeded in establishment of broad and positive relationship with
Russia.
On the other hand, conversations about Ukraine‟s non-aligned status are not
confirmed and there are no specific moves in a direction of its acknowledgement.14 I
argue that the agreement between Ukraine and Russia concerning the 25-year extension
for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea is not simply a complication for Ukraine‟s
non-aligned movement, but a clever political move to reset relations with Russia and
further enhance bilateral cooperation of Ukraine and NATO. In contrast to the approach
of former president of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, who championed a speedy NATO
membership for Ukraine at the expense of Ukrainian-Russian relations, Yanukovych
recognizes that the issue of Ukraine‟s Euro-Atlantic integration creates a division in
society, contributes to political and economic instability and therefore is one of the main
cornerstones of advancement of positive image of Yanukovych.
While Yushchenko used a security approach to obtain access to NATO
membership, Yanukovych appeals to Western constitutive values and norms. In fact,
references to low public support for Ukraine‟s membership in NATO are used by
Ukrainian government to justify the country‟s non-aligned status. Based on Frank
Schimmelfennig‟s analysis, the proper use of “rhetorical action” strategy is the main

14

Vikno.EU, “The NATO in Foreign Policy of Ukraine,” Vikno EU news Web Site, March 10, 2011,
http://vikno.eu/eng/politics/politics/the-nato-in-foreign-policy-of-ukraine.html (accessed April 11, 2011).
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factor that accounts for NATO‟s enlargement decisions.15 Thus, while Yanukovych aims
at shaping the public attitude towards Euro-Atlantic integration, he strategically uses the
rhetoric in order to represent that Ukraine is making tremendous strides toward
democratization and adoption of liberal values and norms. Therefore, I argue that through
a process of “rhetorical action” in regard to the issue of Ukraine‟s joining NATO,
Yanukovych is cleverly stabilizing the country and is creating the conditions for a more
consistent political and economic strategy which in the sphere of mutual relations with
NATO is the de facto continuation of a Yushchenko‟s policy.16
In this context, it is very important to remember that Ukraine‟s joining Alliance
was on Yanukovych‟s agenda when serving as Ukraine‟s Prime Minister in Kuchma‟s
government before the 2004 Orange Revolution. Considering that several times
Yanukovych has shifted his rhetoric in regard to the Ukraine‟s membership in NATO, it
becomes clear that anti-NATO sentiment has always been nothing else than a key
instrument of electoral propaganda in the internal struggle for political power.17 There
should be no doubt that in a political struggle against former Orange forces, anti-NATO
position of Yanukovych guaranteed him support from Russia and played a vital role in
his electoral victory. Soon, after becoming president, Yanukovych formally fulfilled his

15

See Frank Schimmelfenning, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
16
For more on the idea that Ukraine’s “rhetorical action” is the crucial factor that explains the delay to
join the Membership Action Plan of NATO, see Oleksandr Svitych, “Ukraine and NATO: The Failure of
Rhetorical Action” (MA Thesis, Central European University, 2008).
17
Lyudmyla Pavlyuk and Adrian Erlinger, “NATO and Ukraine: Elites’ Actions, Public Perception, and
Polarization,” Merydian – Centre of Informational Researches, http://www.merydian.info/nato.html
(accessed April 12, 2011).
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campaign promise to abandon the pursuit of NATO membership.18 However, in reality
the foreign policy of Ukraine remains rigidly Westernized and according to a great
number of political analysts, practical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO has only
increased. In fact, this policy of Yanukovych is not only consistent with a new strategic
concept of NATO, which postpones any real decisions on the issues of the Alliance‟s
enlargement in the coming years, but calls for the deepening of cooperation between
NATO and its partners.
As of today, NATO and Ukraine continue to cooperate in the frame of the
Annual National Program which “sets out a very active program of cooperation with
defense reform, good governance and dealing with corruption.”19 Furthermore, with
Ukraine‟s and NATO‟s commitment to cooperate in the implementation of wide-ranging
domestic reforms, Ukraine continues to take part in joint military exercises with NATO
forces. As a matter of fact, it is well-known that NATO is ready to draw Ukraine into a
conversation about the deployment of missile defense system in Europe. It is remarkable
that despite Ukraine‟s current neutral status, NATO officials publicly express their beliefs
that ultimately Ukraine will join the Alliance.20 Therefore, I argue that in the public
sphere the present Ukrainian government removed membership in the North-Atlantic

18

“Dvulikij Janus Ukrainskoj Politiki: Ukraina i NATO – Shagi k Sotrudnichestvu ili Put' v Nikuda?”
NovoROSS.Info, April 6, 2009, http://novoross.info/ecskluziv/7101-dvulikiy-yanus-ukrainskoy-politikiukraina-i-nato-shagi-k-sotrudnichestvu-ili-put-v-nikuda.html (accessed April 12, 2011).
19
Yuriy Onyshkiv, “NATO's Robert Simmons: ‘We Believe at Some Stage Ukraine Will be a Member of
NATO’,” Kyiv Post, October 11, 2010, http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/85918/ (accessed
April 11, 2011).
20
Ibid.
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Alliance from the list of foreign policy goals, but in practice Ukraine‟s cooperation with
NATO continues to be active, comprehensive, and, in fact, intensified.21
D. Mixed Policy Motives for NATO Enlargement
Although the analysis of alliance theory is not the focus of this work, within the
context of international relations theory the motives for alliance formation are clear. It is
important to remember that NATO‟s formation in 1949 and the first fifty years of its
existence were closely associated with the period of Cold War in terms of the
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West. It is generally accepted that the
main purpose of the Atlantic Alliance was the containment of the Communist expansion
to the Western Europe and its activity should be examined as a response to the Soviet
threat. In terms of a theoretical study of alliances, it can be said that the existence of
NATO until the end of the Cold War, with its essential function of consolidating NATO
area countries‟ strength, has been grounded mainly on the realist/neorealist philosophies
of international relations and has possessed a security and strategic character.22 In
particular, if the U.S. security guarantees to Western Europe, brought under the
provisions of the Marshall Plan, were considered extremely significant to America‟s
economic and strategic interests, membership in NATO for the European countries
reassured them that their status and sovereignty would be strengthened against
prospective Soviet aggression. Thus, seeking protection from Soviet expansionism on the
part of the weaker European states and the behavior of the major power‟s interest
21

NATO Parliamentary Assembly, “NATO- Ukraine Cooperation Less Politicized, But as Active,” Media
Centre, 2011 Press Releases, July 7, 2011, http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2523
(accessed August 22, 2011).
22
Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," International Organization 50, no. 3
(Summer 1996): 445-475.
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complemented each other and resulted in an integrated military organization with a
clearly identified opponent. As a consequence, NATO emerged as an “alliance concluded
between elites with totally different ends but sharing a similar view of means.”23
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and disappearance of the Soviet
threat, the organization‟s historic objective of balancing a rising Soviet power had been
achieved and the issue of the persistence of NATO in a post-Cold War world has become
of critical importance. The immediate response was the plan by the United States to
enlarge NATO membership into Eastern and Central Europe. Since then, the Alliance
has taken steps to advance its reach not only to former Warsaw Pact countries but to three
former Soviet Baltic states. Contrary to the expectations about the Alliance‟s lack of
relevance in a post-Cold War world, “NATO has added to the list of functions it is
prepared to carry out, broadened its ties to other countries and organizations, and is
working to expand its membership.”24 Recently, despite Russian objections to the
organization‟s expansion into former Soviet republics, NATO offered to strengthen
military and political cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia to achieve a goal of eventual
membership.
While they expressed recognition of general security concerns, the majority of
Central and East European political leaders on their road to NATO membership “avoided
publicly identifying specific potential enemies” and argued that regional instability rather
than a traditional military threat from specific source had been the main reason for their

23

Ernst B. Haas and Allen Suess Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1956), 160.
24
McCalla, “NATO's Persistence after the Cold War,” 446.
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countries to join the military alliance.25 According to Ted Galen Carpenter, such an
argument has always been deceitful and has indicated at a conflict between the elite's
interpretation of state interests and the objectives they wished to attain with NATO
membership.26 Taking into consideration certain declarations by Central and East
European politicians, security factors alone did not move their countries to join NATO,
but concerns of national identity have played a significant role in the formulation of each
country‟s foreign policy.
Furthermore, during the period of Cold War NATO was an obvious illustration of
realist/neorealist philosophy in practice. As a result, the Alliance‟s involvement in the
Balkans, the attachment of NATO membership to continued domestic reforms and the
interplay between the goals and interests of member, applicant and partner states have
hinted at the limitations of the realist/neorealist theory as an explanation of NATO
mission. It is proper to say that the leadership of Ukraine has not considered NATO
solely in military terms and has been mindful that democracy and free markets could be
consolidated by Ukraine‟s membership in Western military alliance. Moreover, it is wise
to remember that NATO has been considered by the government of Ukraine to be a
stepping stone on the path to European Union membership, with all its economic
advantages.27

25

Ted Galen Carpenter, “Strategic Evasions and the Drive for NATO Enlargement,” in NATO Enlargement:
Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute,
2001), 19.
26
Ibid.
27
For an account of this, see Jonathan Dean, “NATO Enlargement: Coping with Act II,” in NATO
Enlargement: Illusions and Reality, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter and Barbara Conry (Washington, D.C.: CATO
Institute, 2001), 124.
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E. Importance and Objective of Study
At the time when the internal debate concerning the question of Ukraine‟s seeking
NATO integration is alive, the geopolitical position of Ukraine as a buffer zone between
traditional East and West contributes multiple levels of entanglement to the issue. As
stated by Hall Gardner, the fact is that “a contemporary, unstable Ukraine is the key
European pivotal state like Poland in the interwar period.”28 This increasing vulnerability
and the restless call of the United States to extend NATO's territorial jurisdiction further
east can lead to the geopolitical conflict. Consequently, Ukraine joining NATO may in
fact decrease its security. Indeed, the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO affects the
course of events in the system of international relations, and thereby demonstrates the
need for a critical analysis of the issue of Ukraine‟s integration in North-Atlantic
Alliance.
While the Ukrainian government argues for the benefits of NATO membership,
several perspectives in international relations show that despite the benefits that Ukraine
expects to derive from NATO membership, it is unwise for Ukraine to pursue
membership. While the pro-NATO forces in Ukraine do not consider the Alliance in
exclusively military terms, the strengthening of Ukraine‟s position vis-à-vis Russia and
protection against a possible Russian threat has been always seen as the main value of
NATO membership for Ukraine. A heightened fear of being caught in a revived form of
Russian influence and an exaggerated perception of the possibility of military conflict
between Russia and Ukraine is behind the pursuit of a pro-NATO strategy. In this thesis,
28
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I show that NATO enlargement should be viewed not as a measure to maintain regional
stability, but needs to be examined in a more complex geopolitical, cultural and economic
context. It is only through challenging the security advantage of Ukraine‟s joining NATO
that it is possible to understand that an endeavor to turn Ukraine into NATO member is
not advanced by Ukraine‟s security concerns. Ultimately, it needs to be acknowledged
that NATO‟s mission has changed beyond its military goals, and NATO‟s expansion
should be discussed from a much broader standpoint than of strategic alignments.
This work seeks to demonstrate that through the context of discursive
construction of multiple challenges for the security of Ukraine, proponents of Ukrainian
adherence to NATO have been actively lobbying for Ukrainian membership into the
Alliance. It was very clear during the presidency of Yushchenko, who was supported by
the majority of Ukrainian-speaking population, when Russia gained a central focus in the
discursive construction of Ukrainian security concerns. Since Yanukovych came to
power, the Russian-Ukrainian relations have improved and the reasoning to look for the
Western security guarantees and assistance against Russia was abandoned. While
Yanukovych has been clear that the issue of Ukrainian incorporation in NATO may
“emerge at some point,”29 the movement to official bringing of Ukraine into NATO has
started to be grounded not on the idea of strengthening Ukraine, but on the adherence to
transform Ukraine into a democratic state with a flourishing market economy.
Second, in exploring the idea of Western proponents having few security concerns
about Russia, I develop an analysis that allows seeing Ukrainian adherence to NATO as a
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way of disciplining Ukraine to neoliberal agenda of global capitalist system. I argue that
membership in NATO means signing on for a wide range of political institutions and
neoliberal economic policies prescribed by the Western governments. The issue of
Ukraine‟s joining NATO will be incorporated into the idea that the economic force
causes the main change in the system of international relations and with it consolidates
unjust political and socio-economic system. It is very problematic to repudiate that
present-day societies, including Ukrainian, are structured around global capital and
production accumulation.30 People all over the world remain exploited by corporate
capitalist elites, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union neoliberal capitalism continues
its expansion as the hegemonic force.
In Ukraine like in other developing countries a new type of the economic system,
far from natural, has been organized and which operates through different separate
institutions. Such an institutional arrangement is not able to function unless society is
shaped and subordinated in a way as to allow structure to operate according to its own
laws. 31 Imperial domination, considered to be the highest stage in capitalist development,
no longer needs the support of ideology and brutal force to keep the population cowed,
but contends to control the societies through a passive consumerism and a policy of
systematical depersonalization. Ukrainian society turned into the actor in the capitalist
system, and membership in NATO will lock into a policy behavior with real inability to
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take control of its own local interests, and through which capitalist hegemon pursues its
economic and geopolitical interests.32
This thesis aims at a critical study of Ukraine‟s possible integration in the EuroAtlantic security space and develops an argument against Ukraine‟s incorporation into
NATO. My argument is that by joining NATO, Ukraine may well become predisposed to
undertake a course of action that will not serve the interests of the people of Ukraine.
Drawing upon the relationship between NATO expansion and the extension of Western
colonialism, I claim that incorporation of Ukraine into NATO will deprive the
government of Ukraine of its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy, and will
make Ukrainians completely dependent on the decisions and policies of the Western
world. Even now, before Ukraine‟s incorporation into the Western concert, we are
witnessing the government ignoring the will of the majority of the population.
The main purpose of this research is to better understand the issue of Ukraine‟s
incorporation in NATO and the complexity of the world through arguments against
Ukraine‟s joining NATO. The thought developed in my thesis will be that NATO is an
instrument of the United States, as the hegemonic power of the capitalist world-economy,
to expand neoliberal hegemonic ideology and fully integrate Ukraine into global
economy. To be sure, this thesis contributes to the idea that NATO should be examined
as an achievement of the U.S. foreign policy and in the context of the U.S. promotion of
international capitalist order. The project views the process of Ukraine‟s incorporation
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into NATO as part of the neoliberal structural adjustment to reconstruct the political,
economic and social order in the post-Soviet country to serve the geostrategic and
economic interests of the United States. Thus, NATO expansion and incorporation of
Ukraine with U.S. military presence as well as strategic and political commitments
should be seen from the perspective of American political interests.
F. Project Overview
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter one provides an overview of UkraineNATO relations. This introductory part of my thesis clearly demonstrates that the process
of Ukraine‟s integration in North-Atlantic Alliance has been always shaped by the
interaction of geopolitical and economic interests of international actors in the region.
Furthermore, this chapter develops an idea that despite the adoption of the non-aligned
neutral status by Ukraine during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, the cooperation
of Ukraine and Alliance has not stopped, but has only intensified. While Ukraine was
rejected the Membership Action Plan in 2008, the process of Ukraine‟s incorporation into
Alliance continues in the frame of the Annual National Program that is considered to be
part of the first cycle of the NATO Membership Action Plan.33 This point is extremely
important in the context of motivation and interests of all actors involved in the process
of NATO enlargement and bringing Ukraine into NATO. By focusing on the mixed
policy motives for Ukraine‟s collaboration with NATO and questioning the prevailing
idea that Ukraine‟s Euro-Atlantic integration continues for security and defense concerns,
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I formulate my position against Ukraine‟s joining NATO and intend to make a
contribution to the debate over the potential membership of Ukraine in Alliance.
While the benefits and positive aspects of Ukraine‟s possible membership in
NATO are known and widely discussed from the standpoint of looking for the ways to
guarantee Ukraine's security, the negative aspects, associated with the incorporation of
Ukraine into the broader capitalist and liberal-democratic space of Western Europe and
North America, are largely unknown and remain to be unquestioned. Chapter two
demonstrates that in my thesis I am determined to provide an analysis of the process of
Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO which employs a methodology based on critical
approach. Despite the fact that it is not possible to define a critical approach specifically,
it offers “a distinct methodological strategy and a unique research program.”34 It should
be taken into account that the project of critical theory does not reject any other theories,
opinions and approaches, but incorporates all of them into studying and explaining of our
social and political reality.
Making use of the critical approach, chapter two introduces theoretical grounding
for the idea that the issue of Ukraine‟s joining NATO should be analyzed within the
context of the world-system. Immanuel Wallerstein‟s ideas help us to understand that the
structure of the international system is based on world capitalist economy, and capitalism
is a “force that had to be understood in global rather than local terms - which means that
emancipation must be a global project.”35 Armed with the understanding that the
development of U.S. hegemony led to reconstruction of global political economy, the
34
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reader is directed to the neo-Gramscian idea of global social order with the hegemony of
the United States which operates through various social relations, international
institutions and culture. While I recognize limitations of these two distinct theories and
their deficiency towards certain positions, I use them in building my argument and
mainly for the purpose of rethinking the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation in NATO. At
the risk of suffering from a great deal of theoretical pluralism, it should be clear that
research methodology that adopts critical theory which in its turn, allows an assessment

of different claims and adoption of certain theoretical assumptions, is necessary.
Chapter three challenges the main argument for Ukraine joining NATO based on
claim that Ukraine would be given collective defense guarantees by the members of the
military Alliance and thereby would significantly improve its security environment and
position vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, incorporation of Ukraine into NATO will in fact
decrease its security.36 Russian reaction to Kiev‟s NATO aspirations means that bilateral
relations would suffer to a greater extent if Ukraine joined the Western military alliance
without Russia. Furthermore, the chapter seeks to demonstrate the problems and
limitations of the realist/neorealist point of view, with its focus on balancing against
perceived threats, and indicate that NATO enlargement into Ukraine should not be
viewed as a measure to ensure Ukraine‟s independence and integrity. Above all, the
purpose of this chapter is to understand the security and identity discourses through
which Ukraine‟s integration into NATO takes place.
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Chapter four examines NATO in exclusively economic and political terms. It
suggests that NATO has been institutionally transformed from a military to a multilateral
organization. Nevertheless, the purpose of this chapter is not to explore the issue of
Ukrainian membership in NATO specifically, but to indicate that political authority
structure for the global economy, social and political life is organized around various
forms of consensus formation in favor of neoliberal disciplinary governance. While this
chapter elaborates on the mechanisms of the global economy, it offers an understanding
of how NATO, as one of the numerous tools of exercising power, plays an active role in
“the rearrangement of political systems in the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones of the
„world-system‟ so as to secure the underlying objective of maintaining essentially
undemocratic societies inserted into an unjust international system.”37 The philosophy of
Antonio Gramsci and the works of critical theorists constitute a fundamentally important
development of my argument and demonstrate how the process of Ukraine‟s
incorporation into NATO is linked to the developments of the capitalist economy.
In chapter five I will focus on the analysis of the evolution of neoliberalism by
considering the essential connections between the notions of imperialism and neocolonialism, in order to prove that NATO is part of a mechanism whose strategic aim is
to extend the particular form of social and political control of Western bloc over the rest
of the world. As part of the argument that Ukrainian membership in NATO is not in the
interests of Ukrainian people, the chapter points to the relationship between neoliberal
globalization and particular form of governmentality. In this sense, my argument builds
on the idea that the steady performance of free markets depends upon thoughtful and
37
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comprehensive regulation which lies in the provision of domestic and international
stability through international interdependence and cooperation.38 As well as other
international organizations, NATO participates in the process of the conversion of the
state into a tool for correcting socio-political and economic policies to the requirements
of capitalist economy.39
In concluding the thesis, chapter six reconsiders the information analyzed in the
previous chapters and confirms my argument against Ukraine joining NATO. The
evidence in the research clearly demonstrates that Ukraine‟s move toward NATO
membership is not driven by the security interests of Ukrainian state. It will become clear
that the issue of Ukraine‟s potential membership in the Alliance should be analyzed from
much broad range of theoretical perspectives than solely focusing on mainstream
theories.
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II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND, LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE OF THE
STUDY
A. Methodology
Central to my thesis is the idea that the current Ukrainian leadership pursues the
same political goals of EU and NATO memberships as former presidents. The previous
introductory chapter has shown that in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration Viktor
Yanukovych prefers more cautious approach. In contrast to Yushchenko, Yanukovych,
whose loyal political base is pro-Russian electorate in eastern and southern Ukraine, is
not able to play to anti-Russian nationalism to get Ukraine into NATO. In order for his
government to look legitimate it is necessary to be perceived as acting in the interests of
the entire population. However, if Ukraine continues to modernize its armed forces and
persists in adapting its legislation to international standards, the necessary measures to
deal with Russian pressure and to influence public opinion will be applied as soon as
political consensus in the West on Ukrainian membership in NATO is reached. The
events of Ukraine's Orange Revolution at the end of 2004 have shown that through
various methods of manipulation it has become possible to mobilize the masses of people
towards government‟s desired objective in a very short period of time.
Certainly, this assertion challenges and contradicts the dominant view about the
world of international relations and Ukrainian politics. However, I seek to question
widespread ideas, certain rules and norms, imposed knowledge and practices. To many
people it may appear that my argument is anti-American or even pro-Russian, however,
in reality I seek to look at the process of Ukraine‟s integration into NATO from the
position of national interests and from the angle that falls outside the mainstream point of
25

view.40 While the debate on Ukraine‟s joining NATO from a realist/neorealist point of
view is widespread and has increasing acceptance, there are many issues related to
identity politics that cannot be explained by the mainstream international relations theory.
Moreover, while this thesis does not make a claim to objectivity or universalism, it is
necessary to “think critically and reflectively about how particular values, assumptions
and concepts are used to describe the current social „reality‟ and possible alternatives.”41
Therefore, realizing that discussions on this topic are mainly based on orthodox
paradigms and being convinced that knowledge and beliefs about everything in the world
are tied to certain discursive contexts, I am very interested in a critical approach that
allows communication between different theoretical paradigms.42 In my case, the answers
to the questions that I ask are not to be discovered by one or two theoretical approaches,
“but by ethical reasoning conducted through dialogue”43 across realist/neorealist,
postmodern, structural, postcolonial, constructivist, liberal/neoliberal perspectives.
Thus, I would like to emphasize my methodology of engagement across numerous
theoretical approaches. For example, the study opens with an analysis of realist/neorealist
approach to the issue of NATO enlargement and Ukraine‟s incorporation in the Alliance.
Examining the realist/neorealist formulation offers us not only a better understanding of
Ukraine‟s motivations for joining NATO, but also expands our vision of how Russia can
behave in conditions that are threatening to its national interest or survival. Nevertheless,
40
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while the literature on alliances has been traditionally realist or neorealist in orientation,
the motives of policymakers of prospective or recently submitted member states as well
as disagreements between the United States and other NATO members makes us turn to
additional theoretical approaches in international relations.44 Clearly, liberal and
constructivist theoretical insights applied in this work help us to see the “nature of the
consensus that provides the basis for stability and order in international society.” 45 The
fact that much of the explanation about NATO‟s continuation after the Cold War derives
from non-realist schools of international relations theory reinforces the idea that none of
the paradigms of international relations can fully account for NATO‟s subsequent
developments since the end of the Cold War.46
Being Ukrainian, it is twice as difficult for me to give an unbiased analysis of the
situation surrounding the Ukraine‟s membership in NATO. Nevertheless, I am very
interested in thoughtful research and strive “to stand outside prevailing structures,
processes, ideologies, and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations
derive from particular political/theoretical/historical perspectives.”47 This is important to
understand as from my personal standpoint, to stand outside means to have a room for
various thoughts and ideas contradicting and rejecting each other, but at the same time to
have an ability to find logic, reason and see the purpose of each of them. To be
considered from outside means to have an ambition to open that outside world to others,
to be a force for change. Finally, being from outside should be rational, based on
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experience and practice of application of knowledge in the real world, today‟s world, real
time.48 The structure of my thesis follows a pattern that “allows us to analyze countries
such as Ukraine not as unique cases with no parallels in the world but as cases that can
fruitfully be compared and contrasted with others.”49 Ultimately, the emancipatory
interest is of main concern for me. It is hoped that this analysis of the issue of Ukraine‟s
joining NATO will contribute to transcending of the traditional boundaries of thinking
about international politics and Ukraine‟s post-Soviet transition in particular.
This study is a product of two years of research in DePaul University and
engagement in a social context that is very different from Ukraine where I started my
scholarship. Having lived for the past seven years in the United States and having
experienced a decentralization of identity, I have learned to observe how the various
discourses which are embedded in cultural and social practices shape both our reality and
identity. It is noteworthy that this thesis is a part of my ongoing analysis about
governmentality and the ways power is exercised. In fact, questions of power relations
have significantly influenced my view not only about Ukraine‟s membership in NATO,
but also about the conception of modernity. While in Ukraine, the discourse of Western
standards is powerful and modernization is defined only in terms of a post-communist
transition, I maintain that Ukraine is still subjected to conditions that continue to place
the country under Western capitalism's neo-colonial domination.
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As will become apparent, in the absence of reference to any prominent
postmodern theorist my challenge to such enlightenment ideas as progress and modernity
is based on my reading of French philosophers, Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard.
My thesis criticizes the view of Western modernization as progress and attempts to show
that under the banner of democracy promotion, economic growth and consumerism
powerful social forces impose the capitalist path of development and the Western-led
model of social and cultural systems to secure their position of dominance and
exploitation. In my work, I make clear that NATO should be examined in the context of
the concept of governance that was formulated by Foucault, saying that global social
forces are exercising their political authority at distance and whose aim is to establish and
consolidate capitalist international order. Furthermore, my study of Ukraine‟s integration
in NATO clearly suggests looking at the process of Ukraine‟s integration into Western
institutions as a way to transform and discipline Ukrainian society according to the
demands of neoliberal capitalism. Without neoliberal model of disciplined control of
individuals, current kind of global capitalism is impossible.50 In this context, the role of
democratic principles and procedures in various institutional structures is crucial.
Overall, my research maintains that in the contemporary world of globalization,
Ukrainian state has become subjected to the agents and structural forces of neoliberal
capitalism. I seek to point out the fact that neoliberalism is a powerful ideology which
weakens state sovereignty and works to further world order on the basis of norms and
mechanisms of global governance. Once again, I have to emphasize that Foucault‟s
vision of power and his ideas about discourse have been crucial for reevaluation of my
50
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positions and beliefs. Drawing on Foucault‟s concept of governmentality it has become
clear that the Ukrainian state has no monopoly on sovereign power, and should be
considered only as an instrument to exercise an authority and legitimize the use of force
over its population. While performing services for national oligarchy, the Ukrainian state
is being forced to operate in the interests of transnational corporations.51
Although the theoretical basis of this research allows for multiple theoretical
perspectives and appropriates a postmodernist position to take a significant place in this
analysis, it should be clear that none of the theories mentioned above carry the task of
changing the international system as it is today. Obviously, postmodernism, while
arguing that our reality is discursively constructed, rejects the struggle to form a new
alternative. For this reason, through linking interest in overcoming economic inequalities
and various forms of oppression, it is decided to adopt critical theory as the basic research
methodology. Focusing on the relations of domination and considering Marx's concept of
false consciousness and criticism of modernity as the initial stage of its development,
critical theory in contrast to post-modernist approach anticipates in creation of new
possibilities for social justice and progress.52
B. Literature Review
Introducing Wallerstein
While the main framework of the research is based on critical theory, at first it is
necessary to examine Immanuel Wallerstein‟s world-system theory. Despite the debates
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of the origins of capitalist development53 and an ongoing critique, concerned with not
giving enough weight to the cultural analysis, Wallerstein‟s world-system approach sheds
a light on the fact that the course of international system is the course of capitalist
economy.54 Wallerstein‟s criticism of modernization theory and his analyses of the
hegemonic power lead not only to the reexamination of the role and position of Ukraine
in the capitalist global world, but also the essence of historical change in general. Initially
it is worth noting that according to Wallerstein, the analysis of any sovereign state such
as Ukraine cannot be done separately from the world-system. Crucial to my argument is
Wallerstein‟s idea that the accurate starting point of analysis should be the capitalist
world-system, and sovereign states have to be seen as a part of organizational formation
within single capitalist world-economy.55 From this perspective, economic and sociopolitical changes in Ukraine along with particular events should be examined in the
scheme of modern capitalist world-system.
Wallerstein‟s method is very useful in understanding that economic base is the
driving force and global capitalism is radically unfair economic, political and cultural
order. Drawing heavily from orthodox Marxist analysis, Wallerstein observes that the
essence of the capitalist world economy consists of unequal exchange relations between
different geographical areas of the world and the parasitic relationship between
developed and underdeveloped countries. While this point is specifically analyzed in
chapter four, it is important to underline that, according to Wallerstein, the capitalist
world-economy operates through the order of cyclical rhythms to which scholar refers as
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to Kondratieff cycles. As Wallerstein summarizes, Kodratieff cycles consists of the phase
A and the phase B which have so far been fifty or sixty years in length.56 Assuming that
capitalism is a system whose dynamic is to spread out or collapse, it should be obvious
that the phase A reflects the recovery and the expansion of the economy, while the phase
B signifies its exhaustion and stagnation. Because significant structural changes are
implemented in the phase B in order to return to the phase A, “a Kondratieff cycle, when
it ends, never returns the situation to where it was at the beginning of the cycle.”57
Following Wallerstein, it should be clear that a series of restoration measures, which have
been repeatedly applied throughout the last 500 years to solve problems of capital
accumulation, resulted in the transformation of the “capitalist world-economy from a
system located primarily in Europe to one that covers the entire globe.”58
In the current historical conjuncture, according to the world-system approach, the
B-phase of the Kondratieff cycle (world-wide economic stagnation), which the capitalist
world-economy experiences, comes to its end and marks the collapse of capitalism.
Acknowledging that there are two scenarios for the future of capitalist world-economy
and one of them is the possibility of the restructuring of the capitalist system and
formation of new wave of cyclic changes, Wallerstein insists that capitalism will be
replaced by a new order either worse or much better, depending on the worldwide
political struggle.59
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Wallerstein believes that capitalism has entered a critical phase, unfavorable for
maximum accumulation of capital and thereby for a new transition into the phase A.
Once again, this means that under this scenario, the current global system of modernity
has reached a crisis point that will eventually lead to the establishment of a new historical
system. This argument, in turn, is supported by Wallerstein‟s assertion that the decline of
U.S. hegemony in the 1970s led to global capitalist crisis. Nevertheless, while
Wallerstein‟s approach offers a cyclical view of history and deliberates on the concept of
hegemony as the necessary structural element of capitalist socio-political and economic
order, it seems that the world-system theorist underestimates the current role of the
capitalist hegemonic state in the system of international relations, the United States.
From Wallerstein‟s viewpoint, the hegemony of the United States has ended
during the capitalist crisis in 1970s. In his work titled U.S. Weakness and the Struggle for
Hegemony, Wallerstein argues that the period of unquestioned U.S. hegemony lasted
during the first twenty-five years of the post World War II period.60 According to the
author, the crucial turning point was the “world revolution” of 1968 which (depending on
location) was seen as anti-liberal and anti-tyranny movements of the working class, the
reaction to U.S. imperialism and a civil-right struggle. Wallerstein claims that in addition
to the dissatisfaction with a pace of economic recovery and weakened socio-political
values, the rise of economic rivals and the U.S. Vietnam‟s defeat, “all taken together,
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mark the beginning of the decline of the United States.”61 To add extra weight to this
idea, Wallerstein notes that it was at this point that the cost of good times with its
consequences started to be experienced. Institutional foundations of post-war prosperity
began if not to fall apart, then to shake noticeably.62
Behind the Curtains: Structural Power
Setting aside the structural economic changes in the world politics during the
1970s, Susan Strange‟s examination of the notion of structural power in international
relations has been a valuable theoretical contribution for this work. Strange suggests that
we reject a classical realist view on the concept of power and hegemony, which
emphasizes the category of the state as the central actor exercising power in the relational
aspect or in terms of resources, and move on to think of power in terms of influence and
ability to determine the way in which the relationship between states, political and
economic institutions, and even individuals have to operate on the national and
international stages.63
While Strange agreed with Wallerstein that a sharp decline of the U.S. power has
taken place, she disagrees that the United States has lost its hegemonic power over the
system of international relations.64 According to Strange, the idea of America‟s declining
power, and the notion that this decline has been a vital cause for the disorder of the
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capitalist world-system is simply a myth.65 Strange is clear that the reason for the
impression of the weakened U.S. authority is the fact that the capital controls have been
dissolved and markets along with their actors have been given much more freedom to
operate in the integrated world. In other words, Strange argues that the decline of U.S.
hegemony can be explained by the government‟s unwillingness to intervene with global
free market mechanisms as opposed to the perception of military or economic failures of
the U.S. in the international arena.66
For Strange, the change in America‟s role and position in the world has been
determined by internal economic factors rather than international and political. As
Strange points out, since 1970s in the U.S. foreign policy the goal of pursuing
commercial and financial interests has finally overcome its political and national
interests.67 This way of looking at things, according to Chris Brown, allows us to see the
influence of America‟s corporate class over its foreign policy.68 It should be clear that
while the strength of the American political system to influence the international agenda
has been weakening, the ability of the U.S. corporate class to exercise power over the
international community has been increasing.69
This does not mean that the United States as a superpower has been in decline,
rather, it has changed its role. As Strange notes, the intensified role of U.S. multinational
companies worldwide signifies that the ability of the United States to exercise influence
and authority has become much greater than that of any other government in the
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international arena.70 Strange argues that although at the height of reorganization of the
international economic system in 1970s there were weaknesses in the American power
and consequently the deterioration of international regimes, the expression of U.S.
hegemony should be sought in international cooperation and global economic and sociopolitical policy-making.71
According to Strange, there are four primary structures upon which the
international system is based and through which the hegemony maintains and operates.
These primary, separate and independent, but at the same time interconnected structures
are: the financial structure, the political structure, the production structure and the
knowledge structure.72 Generally for Strange, all four are significant, and the state-actor
which has primary control over the structures and consequently can gain favorable
outcome without being actively involved in the making of decisions is the most
powerful.73
Neo-Gramscianism and Understandings of International Political Economy
In contrast to the idea that the U.S. hegemony has declined dramatically, neoGramscian approaches in international political economy, which developed in the 1980s,
elaborate on the concept of structural power and argue that the U.S. hegemony did not
end in the 1970s, but has increased significantly. Drawing from Antonio Gramsci‟s ideas
of hegemony and transnational class alliances, neo-Gramscian theorists such as Robert
Cox, Stephen Gill, and Adam David Morton analyze hegemony in ideological, cultural
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and class context and apply the structural power frame to international relations. For
example, Cox, in his work titled Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory, makes it clear that direct control and supremacy of one
state over the chain of other states may be essential but not enough for the hegemony to
be exercised.74 Cox pays much closer attention to the role of ideas and institutions in
maintaining a stable international order and develops an analysis of the U.S. hegemony
which, according to him, is an outcome of the alliance of capitalist class and social forces
from all over the world.
Clearly, although within the state, Wallerstein considers hegemony to be based on
the combination of ideology, institutions and ideas which ensure the continuing
supremacy of leading corporate classes, on an inter-state level, world-system approach
limits itself to the state-centric conception and misses the restructuring of the global
capitalism during the 1980s.75 Gill is among those who heavily criticizes the conventional
notion of hegemony, associated with the behavioral forms of power, and elaborates on
the idea that both domestic and international power spreads not only behaviorally, but
also structurally, in “normative” and “material” proportions.76 As Gill argues, the power
and influence of the United States continues, but nowadays it is through cultural values
such as consumerism and individualism.77 It is important to recognize that this kind of
American hegemony has been built and maintained through the “combination of tactical
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alliances” which have operated though a great variety of institutions.78 Focusing on class
analysis and Gramscian theory, Gill points out that the American corporate class invested
enormous power resources into the formation of transnational capitalist alliances through
which its power and hegemony are exercised on a global scale.79
If we think about the nature of international system since 1970, it should be
obvious that it is structured in a way that produces positive outcomes for the American
corporate class notwithstanding state‟s economic or military position. The ability to set
the global agenda through international organizations and transnational alliances has
provided the United States a possibility to exercise its power with a minimal amount of
force. As Cox underlines, the existence of formal and informal institutions allows
pressure on states to be exercised without a visibility of state‟s power and authority
usurpation.80 Neo-Gramscians point out that international institutions such as IMF, World
Bank, WTO, NATO, and UN Security Council should be seen as instruments of U.S.
hegemony.
In this connection, Stefano Guzzini underlines that the concept of structural power
involves “three different meanings, namely, indirect institutional power, nonintentional
power, and impersonal empowering.”81 Although the activity of global socio-political,
economic and military foundations looks like a consequence of an interaction of intended
and inadvertent influence of actor‟s decisions and non-decisions, according to Guzzini,
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Strange‟s structural lens make a compelling case for the “non-intentional power.”82
Guzzini notes that for Strange, the international system seems to be administered by the
transnational forces whose location is very difficult to identify for the reason of being not
tied to a particular geographic territory, but whose current centre for decision making is
in the United States.83 Following Strange, Guzzini concludes that regardless of the fact
that forces in the U.S. are not always able to control what gets on the international agenda
and what will be the outcome of their decisions or actions, the international structure is
organized “in a way that decisions in countries are systematically tied to and affect actors
in the same and other countries.”84
As is apparent, forces exercising hegemony do not exist exclusively within states.
Examining the issue from the perspective of critical theory, Cox argues that the “entire
world can be seen as a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an
intermediate though autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and
local configurations of social forces within the particular countries.”85 Therefore, it is
extremely important not to take the notion of state and identity as unquestioned starting
points and understand that both the nation-state and national identity have arisen under
certain historical conditions. If we think about the state in terms of this discourse, the
crucial point is that the behavior of actors in the system of international relations is
“shaped either directly by pressures projected through the system or indirectly by the
subjective awareness on the part of actors of the constraints imposed by the system.”86
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In this context, William Robinson makes it clear that if prior to the late 1960s,
state capitalist classes were in well-defined rivalry with each other, in the modern era of
globalization we are witnessing the formation of a world ruling class “whose coordinates
are no longer national.”87 Thus, it is important to note that “as national circuits of capital
become transnationally integrated, these new transnational circuits become the sites of
class formation worldwide.”88 Therefore, capitalist elites, in order to protect their
privileged status act collectively through strengthening and extending international
institutions, democracy and free-trade ideology.89 Those who do not obey the rules of the
dominant capitalist elites and act in the interests of the state, people and communities are
punished with strong sanctions, international isolation or military force.
Strengthening of Ukraine’s Peripheral Structure
Obviously, now we are witnessing the transformation of Ukraine into a fullfledged market economy and finalization of the process of capitalist class formation. The
power in Ukraine belongs to the wealthy echelons of society which are a part of a
complex system working to extend and consolidate Western neoliberal hegemony. As
Ukrainian elite is focused mainly on its personal enrichment, there are doubts about longterm strategic planning in Ukrainian foreign and internal policies. Further, sovereignty of
the Ukrainian state and power of the central government can no longer be considered
absolutely in categories of state or national interest.90 Ukrainian state is becoming more
and more internationalized what means that sovereign power of the state is shifting to
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international institutions and regimes. Therefore, the adoption of key decisions on
strategic development is impossible without active involvement of supranational global
institutions such as UN, IMF, NATO, WTO, G-8, EU, NATO, OSCE and so forth.91 In
this context, the current stage of relations between Ukraine and NATO means a
reorganization of the national forms of governance. In fact, while cooperation between
the Alliance and Ukraine in economic, military and political spheres should be seen in
context of reproduction of hegemonic relationships, possible future membership in
NATO for Ukraine will signify the consolidation and legitimization of capitalist
hegemonic ideology.
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III. THE NEOREALIST ARGUMENT - UKRAINE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND
NATO
A. Argument
While military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is simultaneously the
worst case and a perfectly credible scenario, deterioration in relations between the two
former Soviet republics is inevitable in the case of Ukraine joining NATO without
Russia. Even at the early stage of Ukrainian movement towards NATO, initiated by
former president Yushchenko, Russia‟s negative reaction was apparent. This section of
the thesis places the issue of Ukrainian membership in NATO in the context of the
concept of security from the “methodologically positivist and philosophically realist”92
standpoint, and argues that Ukraine‟s admission to the military circle of the Western
states not only harms European security in general, but expands the danger of war.
As a part of my argumentation that Ukrainian membership in NATO is not in the
interests of Ukraine, this chapter focuses on the main argument of the Ukrainian political
establishment in favor of NATO. The chapter demonstrates that Ukraine‟s incorporation
into the North Atlantic Alliance will decrease rather than increase Ukrainian security “by
placing it in a more vulnerable position than it was before it chose to join the alliance.” 93
Despite the rhetoric, there is a growing realization that the expansion of the military
alliance into Russia‟s geopolitical backyard is extremely risky and may in fact reduce
Ukraine‟s state security. Even during Yushchenko‟s presidency, in a moment when
Ukraine was actively pursuing membership in NATO, Russia had every reason to view
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this as a threat especially when taking into consideration the factor of the United States in
the region. The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, in his speech before the lower
house of Parliament in 2006 said that NATO‟s relations with Ukraine are examined from
the point of view of the Russia‟s national interest and the acceptance of Ukraine will
mean a “colossal geopolitical shift.”94 Since the Orange Revolution, while the U.S. has
been pressing Ukraine toward NATO membership, Russia has been expressing its
dissatisfaction with political leaders‟ ambitions of Ukraine by cutting energy supplies and
intervening in Ukraine‟s domestic politics. Therefore, I argue that NATO membership for
Ukraine will lead to negative consequences for relations between Ukraine and Russia
which may result in an unfavorable outcome for Ukrainian society.
Although there is an impression in the West that the question of war in Europe
has been solved, a nuclear-armed Russia has every reason to view NATO expansion as a
direct threat to its state security which in its turn may lead to the taking of protective
measures on the part of the Russian leadership. The status of the Black Sea Fleet in
Crimea, and considerable Russian-speaking communities in Ukraine, and its economic
dependence on Russian energy resources raise significant concerns about the
unpredictable consequences of Ukraine‟s entry into NATO. The chapter analyzes how
Ukraine can suffer more under NATO and ultimately questions the very credibility of
NATO‟s security commitment to Ukraine in the case of military confrontation.
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B. The Illusionary Fear of Russia
The Neorealist Logic
By claiming that NATO membership for Ukraine will maximize the security of
the country, it is clear that the pro-Western government has used neorealist terminology
to formulate its main argument for Ukraine to join NATO.95 This evidence is supported
by the neorealist assumption that sovereign states are the only actors in the system of
international relations which are motivated by state interest and driven by power. 96
According to neorealism, the interest of each state is its security and survival.
Furthermore, in Kenneth N. Waltz‟s words, “Preoccupation with identifying dangers and
counteracting them become a way of life.”97 This means that states are obliged to
“continually adjust their stance in the world in accordance with their reading of power of
others and their own power.”98 Michael Altfeld argues that the security of a state can be
strengthened either by building up its own military or by joining an alliance formed on
the basis of mutual commitments by states to oppose dangers jointly in case of one being
attacked.99 While the enlargement of the military is financially costly and demands a
considerable expenditure of human resources, membership in an alliance, according to
James Morrow, increases security immediately “with the costs of commitment to the ally,
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the possibility of entrapment, and the need to align policy with the ally to render the
alliance credible.”100
Stephen M. Walt‟s widely cited book The Origins of Alliances concentrates on the
elaboration and testing of a number of hypotheses about alliance formation and
functioning. Walt claims that the behavior of states is determined by threats, and argues
that the process of forming or joining the alliances occurs in the pursuit of security or
autonomy. For Walt, external threats are the primary and the most unquestionable
catalyst to becoming a member of the military alliance. 101 Being focused on external
threats, the state faces a choice between joining a system of collective security or allying
itself with the source of danger and domination. Walt argues that consideration of such
factors as aggregate and offensive power, geographic proximity and certain conditions in
regional or international politics with its ideological and intentional implications play a
crucial role in the state‟s adjusting of its security policy. According to Walt‟s theory, the
conscious choice to pursue membership in NATO and the abandonment of a non-aligned
multi-vector foreign policy is a natural reaction of Ukraine to the perception of the threat
from the Russian Federation and can be explained by a “balance of threat theory.” 102 On
the basis of a “balance of threat theory”, Walt instructs Ukraine to join NATO rather than
keeping its neutral stand or bandwagoning with Russia.
The tense state of relations between Ukraine and Russia has represented the cost
of Ukraine‟s neutrality as extremely high. Being confronted by significant pressure from
Russia, the choice of neutrality for Ukraine seemed to place the survival of the state at
100

James Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science (2000): 76.
Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 26.
102
Ibid., 264.
101

45

huge, visible risk. For Walt, the geographical propinquity of threat is a key factor in the
process of alliances‟ grouping which for its part shapes the perception of Ukraine‟s
political elite and determines the choice of alliance partners. Walt is clear that alignment
with a threatening state is perilous as it only multiplies the resource base of the dominant
actor and strengthens the relations between strong and weak states on the basis of
obedience.103 While perceiving the coalition with others to balance against the threat
from the state nearby, the pro-NATO forces have been confident that the power and
ambitions of Russia will be reduced and thereby NATO membership would enhance
Ukraine‟s regional influence. In reality, Yushchenko‟s NATO ambitions in the face of
solid popular opposition not only put emphasis on the underdeveloped sense of Ukrainian
state interest but also led to the deterioration of its relations with Russia.
The Justification for NATO Membership
While tensions in bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia existed before
Yushchenko became the president, during his five years‟ tenure Russian-Ukrainian
relations worsened significantly. Yushchenko‟s inability to consolidate power and his
failure to implement coherent domestic economic reforms resulted in an intensified
foreign policy approach based on security and geopolitical considerations rather than
economic benefits. Furthermore, identity politics in the form of Ukrainian nationalism
which was stoked under Yushchenko and which was drawn upon to compensate the
failure of the state, has become the main instrument in the hands of political leadership to
“shape both the internal political landscape and the whole set of goals and instruments of
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foreign policy.”104 As the country was pushed deeper and deeper from serious political
crisis into economic decline, the rhetoric of internal security and geopolitics, laden with
identity politics, was intensified. In this context, Mikhail Molchanov, while analyzing
Ukraine‟s policy of European integration, points out that the main objectives and overall
direction of Ukraine‟s foreign policy has always been used by Ukrainian leadership “to
compensate for glaring failures of domestic policy on practically every direction
imaginable.”105 The struggle for power during the entire Yushchenko‟s presidential term
and a serious economic crisis with institutionalized corruption, heavy unemployment and
unprecedented fall in living standards facilitated the growth of anti- Russianism “as the
best proof of democratic credentials and western orientation of newly independent
state.”106 Therefore, on the basis of Molchanov‟s analysis, the point is that Russia has
never been a threat for Ukraine and the sources of Ukraine‟s problems are within
Ukraine‟s elected leadership.107 Nevertheless, focusing on government alone is not
enough. The problem is much deeper and involves the issues in spheres of manipulation
of public consciousness.
Molchanov refers to anti-Russianism not only as a justification of Ukrainian
independence that was developed by Western opinion leaders throughout the first postSoviet decade, but argues that the perception of Russia as an enemy and the rhetorical
reaffirmation of the myth of resurgence of Russian imperialism has been instrumental in
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the country‟s developing of pro-NATO drive. This is to confirm Richard Solomon‟s
assumption made in 1999 that “Ukraine‟s acceptance of a Western policy of actively
pulling Ukraine into NATO would surely sharpen the appearance of an anti-Russian
ideology on the part of the Ukrainian government, thereby severely threatening relations
not only between Russia and Ukraine, but also between Russians and Ukrainians.”108 The
perception of Ukraine as a victim of a hostile Russian foreign policy has been constructed
to alienate Ukraine from Russia as much as possible both in geopolitical and cultural
contexts.109 Thus, while realizing the complexity and sensitivity of the issue of eastward
NATO expansion on Russia's borders, Yushchenko, with strong support of Washington,
was pushing Ukraine into NATO at the expense of its relationship with Moscow.
It should be apparent that Yushchenko‟s approach to bringing Ukraine into
NATO was based on the strategy of raising the level of hatred towards Russia and
represented itself as a justification for Ukrainian membership in the military organization.
Yushchenko was confident that only the perception of Russia as an enemy or a threat for
Ukraine could change the view of NATO within the Ukrainian population and could
bring the case for NATO membership for Ukraine without Russia. The rhetoric and
activity of the former president was directed to reproduce Ukrainian hostility towards
Russia through propaganda that accuses the Russian people for the crimes not just of
monarchial Russia but even for all those of the Soviet leadership against Ukrainian
people.110 In fact, the debate around ethnic differences between Russians and Ukrainians,
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enthusiastically supported by Yushenko‟s government, in turn significantly contributed to
the challenges related to Ukraine‟s state building.
Unfortunately, in spite of the people‟s great optimism and expectations,
Yushchenko was not only unsuccessful in developing pragmatic and balanced domestic
and foreign policies, but significantly contributed to putting Ukraine on the verge of a
split with the western part of the country shifting towards the West and the eastern and
central parts moving towards Russia. Constant speculations about Ukrainian history,
issues of maritime border demarcation and the status of Russia‟s navy in the Crimean
Peninsula, gas disputes, mutual political accusations and aggressive rhetoric by Kiev and
Moscow significantly contributed to the situation which has been found as threatening
and hostile for both Ukraine and Russia. While Russia was making demonstrative and
more conflict-oriented actions to show Ukraine‟s vulnerability to ethnic and linguistic
pressures, Yushchenko‟s push towards Ukraine‟s integration into NATO was grounded
on the view of Russia being a rogue, egoistic and threatening state. The strategic choice
between East and West which has attracted its attention during the events of Orange
Revolution, and Yushenko‟s appeal to Ukrainian nationalism explain the escalation of the
hostile perception of Russia among Ukrainians.
To be sure, under Yushchenko‟s leadership, the Ukrainian perception of Russia as
a threat was intensified and served as a serious destabilizing factor for Ukrainian society.
In this regard, George Liska confirms the idea that a possibility for conflict is the decisive
factor in the alignment and realignment policies of each state.111 As Liska claims, the
primary advantage of the movement toward alignment is deterrence and confrontation of
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rival or adversary. Through the conclusion of agreements in the realm of national security
the stronger state or the partner-states commit to mutual assistance of the potential victim
in the case of possible conflict with another strong power. While the goals which every
state expects to achieve by means of alliance are various, according to Liska, the threat
against the weaker state from the third party is a determining condition in alignment and
realignment processes. Similarly, Glen Snyder stresses that “adversary relations provide
the reason d‟état for alliances and alignments.”112 Therefore, concerns about maximizing
the self-preservation of Ukraine and the necessity to align against Russia served as a
specific motivation for the speediest decision to pursue membership in NATO, what in its
turn was represented as a right choice to serve Ukrainian state interests.
C. Russia’s Security Dilemma
If for the Soviet leadership, the signing on 4 April 1949 of the North Atlantic
Treaty was interpreted as an offensive move by the Western bloc, allowing Ukraine to
join NATO without Russia would signify an immediate geostrategic threat and danger for
Moscow. This fact is supported by the neorealist premise which finds the reason for such
a sense of insecurity in the anarchical nature of the international system.113 Historically,
during the formation of NATO, there was a strong common interest to provide a defense
against the Soviet bloc. At the same time, Soviet Union had to take actions to protect
itself. The Soviet response to the formation of the military Alliance was to enhance its
own power and security by the counter-formation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance as
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well as the founding of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.114 From the position of the neorealist
theory of international relations, the behavior of the Soviet Union was caused by the fear
of insecurity generated by the uncertainty about the intentions of the United States.115 In
its turn, the formation of a counter-alliance provided reasons for NATO members to
consider the behavior of the Soviet Union as aggressive. Since no side could recognize
that the buildup of the military power was defensively inspired, each had to presuppose
that it could be planned for attack.116 Such an illusionary perception of security, based on
the uncertainty about others‟ intentions, has served to be the explanation for the Cold
War and the successful existence of the North-Atlantic military alliance since 1949.
The Russian Fear of Geo-Strategic Threat
The Russian perception of the Atlantic Alliance and its enlargement elicits an
antagonistic reaction from Moscow and is an important factor in Ukraine‟s desire to join
NATO. In the minds of the Russian political elite as well as the average Russian, the
prospect of a new wave of NATO expansion to include Ukraine indicates a “continuation
of the policy aimed at pushing Russia out of its traditional spheres of influence, and a
move that signifies Russia‟s encirclement with international protectorates or mandate
territories of a Bosnia-Kosovo type.”117 For Russia, on the basis of the historical
assumptions, the process of NATO‟s eastward enlargement seems to be motivated by the
Western intentions to exploit Russia‟s weakness and should not be viewed as a peaceful
process. In fact, a strong opposition to the idea of Ukrainian membership in NATO and
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the Alliance‟s continuous expansion all the way to Russia‟s borders is a clear sign of
NATO‟s dismissal of Russian interests, and therefore evokes a harsh reaction from the
Russian political establishment. If the inclusion of three Baltic countries heightened
Russia‟s sense of isolation, the Ukrainian accession to NATO, according to the average
Russian, would be decisive evidence of Western attempts to isolate and subordinate
Russians at the same time.118 The point is that while Western World perhaps views
NATO as being transformed into a political organization, in Russia, the Alliance is
considered in purely military terms. From the Russian perspective, plans to incorporate
Ukraine into the Western military alliance along with the American proposal to deploy
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) components in Eastern Europe are grounded on realist
reasoning and are targeted against Russia, regardless of whether there is an authoritarian
or democratic form of government. Western behavior has been interpreted as aggressive,
and an extension of NATO‟s influence as a threat to Russia‟s security.
Within Russian society it is generally accepted that the process of NATO
enlargement is connected to Western perceptions of Russia as being a potential enemy.119
Such an assumption is based on anti-Russian opinions, prevalent mostly in the United
States and Eastern Europe, which are rooted in the past dating back hundreds of years,
and which since the end of the Cold War have continued to be full of hostility. 120 The
growth of Russia‟s defense spending, its attempts to preserve its traditional sphere of
influence and its elimination of domestic opposition have contributed to an image of
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Russia as a potential threat. This view of Russia as a source of danger was recently
reinforced by the depiction of war in Georgia by the Western mass-media. While
rejecting Georgia‟s role in starting the conflict along with ignoring the importance of the
U.S. material support to Saakashvili's regime, Western journalists, according to historian
Herbert Bix, “Fostered Russophobic sentiment by disseminating completely one-sided
war news, demonizing Russia as the evil aggressor, and championing „democratic‟,
peace-loving Georgia.”121 While realizing that it is not possible to completely grasp the
objectivity and being willing to adjust myself to the relativity of truth claims, I tend to
agree with this viewpoint. Moreover, this debate clearly demonstrates how power
relations contribute to the formation of certain knowledge and leads to conclude that
perceptions play a critical role in the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO.
As seen from Moscow, a new round of hostility towards Russia clearly confirms
that the West‟s struggle against communism and the Soviet Union had not ideological,
but exclusively geopolitical meaning. This viewpoint finds its support in different schools
of thought regarding the strategic geopolitical importance of the area of the former Soviet
bloc precisely to the United States.

Nevertheless, to provide a clear and a strong

explanation for NATO‟s engagement with the countries of the former Soviet Union, it is
necessary to refer to the geopolitical views of one of the prominent advocates of NATO‟s
membership for Ukraine which is motivated by the resentment toward Russia. Zbigniew
Brzezinski, former national security advisor in the Carter administration, has portrayed
Russia‟s exercise of its influence on neighboring states as a extension of uncivilized and
“proto-imperial approach”, and has argued for the adoption of the Western policy of
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“geopolitical pluralism” that should seek as its primary objective to guarantee that Russia
would not become a “mighty supranational state and a truly global power.”122 According
to Brzezinski, the political, military and economic integration of the newly independent
states of Central and Eastern Europe should be a basic strategy of the Western
geopolitical approach.123
Furthermore, in terms of Russian-Ukrainian relations, Brzezinski confirms this
mode of thinking by arguing that “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but
with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an
empire.”124 Therefore, as it can be seen from this realist analysis of the role and place of
once-Soviet states in Europe, it is clear that NATO‟s engagement with Ukraine is a part
of a broader policy directed to oppose Russian interests in the region. Unfortunately,
being great supporters of Ukraine‟s NATO membership, the majority of Western thinkers
and policymakers such as Brzezinski simply ignores both the real interests of ordinary
Ukrainians and their everyday reality and has been consciously pushing Ukraine into a
culturally driven conflict with Russia.125
The Problem of Self-Identification
Ironically, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Ukraine and Russia have
found themselves to be confronted with severe problems of self-identification and
statecraft. In this context, Igor Klyamkin, Alexander Akhiezer and Igor Yakovenko have
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argued that Russia‟s political crisis with the West during the Ukraine‟s presidential
elections in 2004 was a conflict based on cultural principles.126 According to the scholars,
the obvious explanation to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine is the fact that not only the
Ukrainian political elite but also a considerable part of Ukrainian society have acquired
the European identity and are on their way to the full integration into Western
civilization.127 It should be pointed out that for Russia, allowing Ukraine to join Western
institutions without Russia means an indication of imminent danger to Russian national
identity which is grounded on the common history of the East Slavic peoples. Therefore,
while this chapter argues against Ukrainian membership in NATO from the
realist/neorealist perspective, it is also important to recognize subjective and behavioral
obstacles to this membership that are closely related to the issues of national identity.
It is a little wonder that with a Russian perception of the Atlantic Alliance and
with the level of mutual interdependence between two states, Russia has been
antagonized by the intentions of pro-Western leadership to alienate Ukraine from Russia
culturally, as well as geopolitically. Linked to these, Klyamkin, Akhiezer and Yakovenko
underline that “When Western civilization begins to expand by absorbing parts of the
former Soviet empire, the logic of civilization is replaced by the logic of geopolitics.” 128
The authors suggest an idea that Ukraine‟s membership in NATO would signify the
moment of Slavic civilization‟s loss of its basis, and thereby would advance the Russia‟s
identity crisis to its depth. In fact, it should be plain that Russia‟s identity crisis involves
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the issue of devaluation of Russia‟s long-standing identity as a strong Eurasian power in
which the concern for Slavic-Orthodox unity dominates.
While realizing that classification scheme to which we can also address Eastern
Slavs is a modern construct and which is very problematic to apply in the academic work,
it is also very important to understand that “all nations tell a version of their histories that
is shaped by present circumstances.”129 Nevertheless, of all countries of the former Soviet
Union Ukraine has the strongest cultural ties to Russia and is the most important partner
country, but both nations are also intimately linked. Consequently, as Molchanov notes,
considering the traditional Russian perception of Ukraine as a younger brother, if not
actually a part of a large Russian ethnicity, the vision of inviolable border between the
two states means much more than a conventional military dispute.130
As a response to the crisis of Russia‟s dislocation of cultural bonds after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, a discourse of reunification and preservation of EastSlavic civilization of which Ukraine is an important part, and the idea of the domination
of Russia in the Eurasian world has represented an attempt to solve the national question
for Russians. The fact that a great number of Russians live in neighboring states has
become a crucial factor in the debate on who should belong to the Russian nation or
whether Russia can sustain its image of the “unique” country, or even a separate
civilization. According to a great number of Russian scholars and politicians, the
development of Russian identity not only requires the unification of all Russians under
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one political structure but also demands a multi-ethnic approach which involves the
unification of all Eastern Slavs into one federal unit.
Proponents of preserving the East Slavic civilization insist on the restoration of
“the ties of organic solidarity between people, which are increasingly lost with the
advance of Western civilization.”131As Vera Tolz says “linguistic and cultural similarities
between Eastern Slavs and alleged common history, stretching back to the medieval
principality of Kievan Rus” are the key elements that form the positive attitude of the
majority of Russians to the view that Belarusians and Ukrainians are a part of the Russian
nation.132 Moreover, it is important to underline that the majority of average Russians
very often see themselves as “Soviet people” and regard the former Soviet space as their
homeland. Thus, the idea of “all-Russian unity” which in turn demands an alteration of
post-Soviet borders and limiting the sovereignty of Russia‟s independent post-Soviet
neighbors “reveals a supranational, civilizational tendency” in the resolving of Russia‟s
crisis of national identity.133
Igor Zevelev stresses the dramatic growth of the formulations of the ideological
factors of the Russian foreign policy in the context of “civilizational affiliation of the
country”, noting that “beginning in 2008, for the first time since the Soviet Union‟s
breakup, the Russian government began to speak in terms of a large supranational
project.”134 Nevertheless, while Zevelev acknowledges that identity is shaped by
discursive practices and points out that supranational project in any form is a product of a
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ruling class, he argues that current Russian domestic and foreign policy formulations in
terms of civilizational affiliation resulted from “the failure of attempts to become an
independent part of the Greater West” and as a consequence of tense relations with the
West in particular.135
The key point we derive from the constructivist analysis of Ukraine‟s and
Russia‟s identity problem is the “honest assessment of the Ukrainians‟ and Russians‟
common past.”136 Although a great number of contemporary Ukrainian, Russian and
Western historians are involved in a struggle for an explanation of the origin of the Slavs,
it is necessary to realize that Kievan Rus as a long-lasting East Slavic political entity
existed before the modern Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussian nations developed.
Ukraine‟s and Russia‟s historical and political identification are interconnected, “their
languages are traceable to a common root, their ethnic features exhibit profound
similarities, and their mutual perceptions on a mass level are generally not hostile.”137 As
Anatol Lieven comments, “These links have not just been forged over the centuries by
Russian, then Soviet, governments but have also developed „organically‟ through
millions of human contacts over hundreds of years.”138
If the links between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples are to be disappeared, it
should be allowed to occur through a slow and natural process of erosion, “without
diktats, and without the stirring up of new ethnic hatred where none has so far existed.”139
In this context, Molchanov indicates that “because of Ukraine‟s intimate connection to
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Russian politics and society and Ukraine‟s crucial proximity to the very sense of Russian
national identity,” Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO will represent the greatest
challenge to Russia‟s long-term statehood and eventually may bring the country to
catastrophe.140 In other words, with the deprivation of its Ukrainian essence, Russia will
discontinue being the Russia we knew, and it will be required to reconstruct its
identity.141
Ultimately, the policy of NATO enlargement is perceived by the Russians as antiRussian, and admittance of Ukraine into the alliance is considered as a course of action
aimed to increase a distance between Russia and Ukraine. Therefore, while the
contemporary situation in Ukraine with two centers of gravity represents a danger for
Russia, the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO unilaterally causes feelings of horror not
only among fanatical nationalists but also among people of liberal-democratic
convictions.142 Considering that the expansion of NATO is producing new dividing lines
on the map of Europe as well as paying attention to anti-Russian attitude expressed in
Western World and produced by those like Brzezinski, there is a complete justification
for Russia of being suspicious or even afraid of the West.143
D. From Risk to Immediate Danger
With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, NATO was deprived of a reason for
its existence as a military unit, and this created a problem for the realist/neorealist
explanations of NATO expansion. However, while it is true that NATO has faced no
140

Molchanov, Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations, 275.
Ibid., 246.
142
Ibid., 243.
143
For more on Russia’s legitimate concerns, see Lieven, “The NATO-Russia Accord: An Illusory Solution,”
144-146.
141

59

immediate threat, neorealists argue that the existence and enlargement of Alliance is
directed to meet a potential threat from a resurgent Russia. From a neorealist point of
view, the very exclusion of Russia and the growth of anti-Russian opinions in Eastern
Europe is clear evidence that Russia continues to be a potential threat to NATO. While
Russia has taken reciprocal steps to restore its defense capabilities, in the West this has
been immediately interpreted as a revival of a military threat. Furthermore, Russian
worries about NATO enlargement are portrayed as “an additional reason to fear and
distrust Russia.”144
Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder develop a theoretical argument
concerning the alignment to balance against the greatest perceived threat.145 Christensen
and Snyder disagree with Walt‟s assertion that states should join in an alliance against the
perceived threat and argue that successful pursuing of security in the multipolar world
demands avoiding of alliances. This view holds that the increase of defense through
forming the alliance in order to balance a threat decreases the security of the threatening
state, and thereby gives a rise to the security dilemma which in turn provokes
competitiveness and warfare. According to Christensen and Snyder, the multi-polar
structure of the international system by itself is very dangerous and any active behavior
of a state actor aimed at pursuing their interests may threaten the stability of the system
and inevitably lead to nationalistic clashes with other states.146
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Despite the questionable status of the real motives of NATO enlargement, with
the approach of powerful NATO military force to the Russian borders, the possibility of
surprise attack on Russia from the West increases dramatically. In light of Russia‟s
perception of NATO and the strategic importance of Ukraine for Russia, in the event of
Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO, Russia will take short countermeasures. Because
Russia will never reconcile itself to the humiliation and infringement of its state interests,
further expansion of NATO without Russia would not only harm Russian-Ukrainian
relations, but may threaten the entire structure of European security. 147 The entry of
Ukraine into NATO raises the possibility that in case of military confrontation between
Russia and any other member of the alliance, the territory of Ukraine may become the
main scene of military confrontation
I tend to agree with the viewpoint that NATO‟s membership for Ukraine, while
excluding Russia, “increases the most important potential threat to Ukraine, which is an
internal one.”148 It is reasonable to expect that Ukraine‟s admittance into NATO would
lead to resource depletion what in its turn could have the greatest impact on the economic
and cultural destiny of the country. Moreover, being culturally divided with the eastern
and central regions bearing a stronger Russian influence and the western regions pursuing
a strong Western direction, turning Ukraine into a Western military ally would rise
nationalist sentiments what would further divide Ukrainian society. Even the preliminary
position and reaction of Russian government on the issue of Ukraine‟s joining NATO has
contributed to a split of culturally and ideologically divided Ukraine. Under such
circumstances, an open conflict between pro-Western and pro-Eastern Ukraine is likely.
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In this case, there are no doubts that Russia would stand on its interests and would not
leave its Russian Diaspora without support.149 Furthermore, according to Lieven, such a
scenario would provide an opportunity for annexation of Crimean Peninsula and Eastern
Ukraine to the Russian state.
This assumption can be supported by the view of Samuel Huntington that culture
will be central to any future conflict.150 If the wars of the previous centuries were
“primary conflicts within Western civilization,” with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
interactions between Western and non-Western civilizations will determine the evolution
of conflict.151 For Huntington, while the division of Europe on the basis of ideology has
vanished, the cultural separation between “Western Christianity, on the one hand, and
Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other hand, has reemerged.”152 Ukraine is
situated on the dividing line in Europe and is culturally divided between the Catholic and
Orthodox worlds.153 While pointing to the events in Yugoslavia, Huntington argues that
cultural dividing line is a line of instability and bloody conflict. As Jennifer Moroney
affirms, “being therefore unable to play that central role in the stability and security of
Central Eurasia that is so often ascribed to it,” Ukraine cannot fully integrate into the
West.154 Furthermore, according to Huntington‟s analysis, it is clear that any pro-Western
move by the country that is closer to the opposite culture is extremely risky for its
security. In short, Huntington‟s civilizational paradigm provides an intelligible
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framework for understanding that “harmony between Ukrainians and Russians in Ukraine
is the cornerstone of stability not just of Ukraine but of the entire region.” 155 Huntington
makes a crucial point for this research by noting that while a realist approach to the
situation between Ukraine and Russia “highlights the possibility of a Russian-Ukrainian
war, a civilizational approach minimizes that and instead highlights the possibility of
Ukraine splitting in half.”156
Realizing the reality of the situation, it is hard to have confidence in the
determination of NATO to intervene on Ukraine‟s behalf in the case of war.157 It is not
obvious how defense guarantees to Ukraine can be honored in the event of a
confrontation with a nuclear Russia.158 Moreover, in the event of a military conflict
between Russia and Ukraine which can begin over the matter of Russian Black Sea Fleet,
situated in a Crimean city of Sevastopol which has a majority of ethnic Russians, any
credible defense of Ukraine would demand a deployment of the ground military forces.159
It is not in Germany, Italy‟s or even America‟s interests to defend a state that only a few
years ago was considered to be on the opposite side of an ideological and geographical
divide. As Christensen and Snyder notes, there is no guarantee that any of the member
states can be protected until the other members of the alliance assume all the calculated
risks.160 Allies have and maintain various ideas of their interests and the question of how
much a state behaving in its state interest will contribute to security guarantees of other
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states is not clear.161 Morrow underlines that “A decision to intervene in a crisis will be
determined in part by specific interests of the state in the issues of that crisis.” 162 There
are too many differences among the interests of NATO members and too many nuances
in the Ukraine-NATO-Russia triangle which also raises doubts in the ability of the U.S.
to honor its commitment to NATO members. The negative attitude of Western Europe
towards Ukraine‟s initiative to become a full-pledged member of Euro-Atlantic security
arrangement throws doubts on the credibility of NATO and implies a supposition that
NATO‟s expansion is meant to transit the cost of fighting Russia to Ukraine. Hyland
suggests an idea that in “the face of current and prospective military realities, a NATO
military guarantee will become a frivolous gesture.”163 Thus, Ukraine can become a base
coin in the geopolitical game of great power politics.
E. Conclusion
Similar to the process of alliance formation during the period of Cold War, in the
event of NATO enlargement, the perception of security threat has served as one of the
legitimizing foundations for new and potential members to be incorporated into the
military alliance. In the case of Ukraine, the active drive towards NATO membership
gave the rise to anti-Russian ideology, and thereby significantly threatened relations not
only between Russia and Ukraine, but also led to the internal instability in Ukraine. It is
important to note that prior to Yushchenko‟s pushing Ukraine into NATO, relations
between Ukraine and Russia had generally been stable. Despite the rhetoric of Ukrainian
and Russian politicians, the level and quality of Russian-Ukrainian relations indicated
161
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that Ukraine could not be threatened with Russian subjugation or conquest. Although
NATO has been transformed in responsibilities and tasks since the early 1990s,
Yushchenko‟s active pulling of Ukraine into NATO on Washington‟s urgings was clearly
grounded on security concerns and was motivated by fear of the enemy. In arguing in
neorealist terms, the question of Ukraine‟s joining NATO became crucial to the subject
of Ukrainian independence and state sovereignty. In fact, it should be apparent that in the
absence of a threat, NATO enlargement and Ukraine‟s incorporation in the Alliance
while excluding Russia could never occur.
From the recent rapprochement between Ukraine and Russia under the leadership
of Yanukovych, it is clear how the interests of the policymakers influence and shape any
particular course of actions. The decisive defeat of Yushchenko in Ukraine‟s 2010
presidential elections and the disappearance of hostility toward Russia are one of the
numerous indicators that the behavior of Yushchenko‟s government was not driven by
the interests of the Ukrainian population. The impression seems to be that under the
Orange leadership, Ukraine‟s state interest and its policy toward NATO membership was
defined by the U.S. policy of “geopolitical pluralism” which was designed to expand U.S.
influence to the borders of Russia. Not only was the Ukrainian state interest under
Yushchenko subjectively driven, but the entire issue of Ukraine‟s security was defined
through a discourse of Russia as an existential threat. In this context, it is clear that the
social constructivist approach of international relations is extremely useful to examine the
issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO.
At the same time, I do not make any claim that under the current leadership of
Yanukovych, the government has a positive role in advancing the interests of Ukrainian
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people. The point is that since Ukraine gained its independence there has been no
consensus about the Ukrainian state interest and its foreign policy approach. Being
divided on the issue of Ukraine‟s foreign policy orientation, Ukrainian ruling elite has
always put its own private economic interests ahead of the Ukraine‟s state interest.
Ultimately, it should be clear from this chapter that the hypocritical myth of Russian
drive for imperialism and aggression was created by the West through the reinterpretation
of history, and which has been successfully adopted by the pro-Western ruling elite as a
conceivable reason for the full integration into the Western institutions.
More important, matters of identity, community, and culture demonstrate an
important point in the analysis of Ukraine‟s foreign policy and indicate that the potential
threat to Ukraine comes from within in the form of ethnic nationalism which gains
strength from Western desire to impose on Ukraine the U.S. led international order.
Admittedly, any effort to incorporate Ukraine into NATO would result in a new wave of
anti-Russian nationalism which in turn “could produce exactly what the West should fear
most, a reaction in Russia and the Russian diaspora.”164 As a result, this would fuel the
growth of Russian ethnic nationalism which would obviously have an effect on Russian
foreign policy, and thus make war between these two neighbors and the split of Ukraine
very likely.165 The most straightforward explanation for this is the conviction of a great
number of Russians that Ukraine is at very heart of the Russian state-building problem.
While arguing that the Russian Orthodox Church was born in Kiev and drawing on the
history of Kievan Rus, Molchanov makes it clear that in some respects Ukraine is more
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“Russian” than Russia itself.166 There are no doubts that for Russian nationalists, the case
of Ukraine‟s choosing the “wrong side of what many see as a global divide separating the
Russia-led world of Orthodoxy and the consumerist, individualist, and exploitative
West,” would signify the kiss of death.167 Consequently, Russia would be forced to take
defensive measures in strategic terms.
The expansion of NATO and incorporation of Ukraine into the Alliance is “an
unnecessary, expensive, and provocative initiative with perilous implications.”168 If for
Russia, Ukraine‟s induction into NATO would signify more than just crossing the “red
line” of what Russia considers its sphere of influence, for Ukraine it would mean only an
illusion of security. In addition, Ukraine‟s economic dependence on Russia contributes
greatly to the idea that Ukraine cannot pursue NATO membership at the expense of
Ukrainian-Russian relations. Indeed, as discussed in this chapter, Russia‟s perception of
Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO is a key factor which is critical to Russian-Ukrainian
relations and to Europe‟s stability overall.
The incorporation of a country with a large Russian population and huge cultural
differences would be destabilizing and is unlikely to make the continent of Europe more
stable. It is quite clear that with Ukraine‟s admission into the military alliance, the
potential for military confrontation with Russia increases. In its turn, the likely war
between Russia and Ukraine may spill into the number of conflicts between European
NATO member states and Russia, and this thereby would increase the danger of a
Russian-American confrontation. Certainly, that would cause not only a European crisis,
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but would lead to a disastrous outcome. However, in a hypothetical case of military
conflict between Russia and Ukraine, NATO allies can refrain from participation on the
side of Ukraine. According to the majority of military experts, the U.S. involvement
along with the European allies in hostilities against Russia, with its powerful nuclear
arsenal, looks quite doubtful. NATO members can make pledges to defend Ukraine under
Article V of the NATO Treaty, but in times of crisis there is no guarantee they will keep
their promises, and thus NATO membership for Ukraine may result only in a paper
security guarantee.169 The point is that the key benefit of Ukraine‟s membership in
NATO, which is the collective defense guarantees, is uncertain.170
This chapter has focused on the main argument of the Ukrainian political
establishment in favor of Ukraine‟s membership in NATO and demonstrated that
bringing Ukraine into NATO will decrease rather than increase Ukrainian security.
Although I have tried to concentrate on realism/neorealism to analyze Ukraine‟s and
NATO‟s behavior toward each other and to address the Russian factor as the most
important in the issue of Ukraine‟s membership in NATO, I am sure that it has been clear
that my main argument against Ukrainian membership in NATO remains distant from the
realist/neorealist position. Considering the arguments in this chapter, it should be
apparent that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine‟s
security concerns. The next chapter outlines that for the West, Ukraine‟s Euro-Atlantic
integration means more than being a member of a collective security system.
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IV. FROM SECURITY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CHANGING
FACE OF NATO
A. Argument
While the previous chapter focused on the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into
NATO mainly in the context of Ukraine‟s and Russia‟s security interests, this chapter
takes the discussion outside the security concern of NATO enlargement with regard to
Western interests. The chapter builds on the idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991 left NATO without a clear threat, and this in turn led the Western military alliance
to extend not only its geographical reach but also the scope of its operations. NATO‟s
transformation has made it a different kind of organization that not only provides a
defense for its members against any military challenge, but, more importantly, serves as a
tool to promote the growth of capitalist neoliberal hegemonic ideology into Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
While proponents of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO argue that membership
in the military alliance will serve as an incentive for domestic reforms and demonstrate
Ukraine‟s commitment to Western norms of behavior, I situate the modernization of the
state associated with NATO membership in connection with the continued domination of
the Western socio-political and economic models over the global community. The aim of
this chapter is to establish a starting point for explaining the idea that the development
and the concept of modernization with its numerous strategies serve as a mechanism to
ensure the survival of the capitalist world-economy and to advance the interests of the
already developed countries of the West. For the purpose of this thesis, it should be clear
that thinking of modernization and development in terms of power and discourse enables
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us to see that neoliberalism, as a campaign of capitalist expansionism, involves an
exercise of a hegemonic system of rule which represents our social reality and thereby
enforces the domination of the U.S.-led Western knowledge and conceptions about the
world.
The current chapter provides the analysis of neoliberalism as philosophy and
ideology and requires thinking about the issue of Ukraine‟s integration into NATO in
terms of globalization and power relations. The analysis in this chapter is crucial for our
understanding that along with other international organizations NATO participates in the
process of the transformation of the state into a tool for correcting national socio-political
and economic policies to the demands of global capitalist economy.171 In fact, to
understand the argument that the concept of modernization and the politics of neoliberal
development should be seen as a discourse of power and control, it is necessary to make a
brief excursion into Immanuel Wallerstein‟s analysis of a capitalist world economy.
Of course, it should be acknowledged once more that there is no single path to
investigate the ways in which power operates. However, using the world-system
conceptualization to provide an explanatory framework for the analysis of the issue of
Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO helps us to unpack the complex processes of
neoliberal legitimizing and institutionalization, involved behind the scenes. Furthermore,
the chapter points to the neoliberal and complex regime of governance, which involves
not only the issues of regulation and global stability but also the matters of discipline and
control of individuals.
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B. Hidden Agenda? Advancing Development
Even if one accepts the argument that NATO is extremely important in pacifying
European anxieties and deterring a potential aggressor, it is increasingly evident that the
expansion of NATO and the incorporation of Ukraine into the Alliance is based on
Western terms and is tied to the changes in the domestic political and socio-economic
order of Ukraine. While liberal pluralists argue that international and non-governmental
organizations, peace, trade and democracy are reciprocally reinforcing and necessary
corollaries for promotion of political stability and military security in Europe and North
America, they have trouble explaining why the process of NATO enlargement excludes
Russia.172 It is also unclear why the Alliance with its Wilsonian principles of constructing
peace along the lines of universal legal norms, liberal democracy, economic globalization
and respect for human rights has not been used to affect Russian policy by including
Russia in NATO.173
With the disappearance of the Soviet threat and Western triumph in the Cold War,
NATO lost its military role that in turn led to the necessity of reconstruction of its
identity.174 As Steans and Pettiford summarized, “It did so by refocusing its aim to
protect and spread liberal democracies, taking on board the liberal argument that
democracies do not fight each other.”175 For Michael C. Williams and Iver B. Neumann,
a crucial factor in reinventing of NATO‟s identity as a “democratic security community”
was the problem of Russian post-Cold War self-identification and its choice between
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Western and Eastern civilizations.176 Williams and Neumann are clear that while in the
beginning of 1990‟s NATO started to be increasingly represented as a Western
civilizational entity, under the pressure of communist-nationalist opposition and with
regard to seventy years of Soviet history, Russia was bound to give up its early liberalinternationalist position and demonstrate resistance to a Western civilization and NATO
enlargement in particular. The Russian leadership was forced to choose between
abandoning the agenda of the cultural argument and accept the enlargement of NATO, or
remaining a counter-civilizational force and consequently entail an opposition to NATO
enlargement only at the cost of being cast as an anti-Western, anti-democratic and neoimperialist state outside of the new Euro-Atlantic security community.177 Indisputably,
Russia‟s move towards multilateral foreign policy and its Eurasian role has played into
the hands of those who have perceived Russia as a threat and have stated that NATO
should expand with or without Russian approval.178 Therefore, it is apparent that NATO‟s
persistence and enlargement must be understood in the context of its transformation in its
own identity where security, military, and culture have become increasingly tied to the
issues of democracy and market economy.179
Even though post-Cold War Russia has never been a threat to either Western or
Eastern Europe, the perception that Russia poses an actual threat is necessary for the
promotion of domestic reforms in new NATO member states.180 For Lars Skalnes, the
very feelings of insecurity, which have pushed the countries of the former Soviet Bloc
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toward NATO, provide an incentive for domestic reforms. The more a new member of
the Alliance considers Russia as a potential threat to its security and the more NATO
shows its commitments to its defense, the greater the influence of NATO membership on
domestic politics and thus the foreign politics of this new member.181 Logically, Skalnes
points out, that in order to sustain a belief that NATO offers a protection against a
potential Russian aggression, and thus for NATO to maximize its impact on domestic
politics of the NATO member state, Russia should be excluded from membership.182
Such remarks reveal that the interest of NATO members in Ukraine‟s incorporation into
the Alliance is very difficult to explain in the context of European security and
demonstrates that NATO is one of the most important instruments at the disposal of
Western policymakers to constructively integrate Ukraine into the community of
countries that share political and economic values and principles.
In the minds of leading pro-Western Ukrainian politicians, Ukraine‟s membership
in Euro-Atlantic security space means an improvement of investment climate, opening
new economic possibilities and changes resulting in the increase of the welfare of
Ukrainian citizens. The claim that NATO enrolment promotes democracy, free market
values and paves the way for European Union membership provides an additional public
justification for Ukrainian politicians to strive to enter the Euro-Atlantic security space in
the period of transition from communism. Indeed, the fact of NATO‟s transformation
from an exclusively military alliance with a clear enemy into a mechanism of promotion
and strengthening of Western-defined norms and values suggest an idea that membership
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in the Alliance is only an interim surrogate for the real goal of economic growth and
development.183 While Western policymakers claim that the main factors hindering
Ukraine‟s progress are domestic, the point of NATO‟s membership influencing domestic
politics and extending the correct form of governance provides the evidence of NATO‟s
playing an instrumentally considerable role on Ukraine‟s path to neoliberal development
and transformation. In other words, Ukraine‟s ambition to join the NATO community
should be viewed as a part of a broader structural policy of modernization which is
equated with the neoliberal policy paradigm.
C. Neoliberalism As the Only Path to Development
“There is no Alternative”184
Although, it is impossible to define neoliberalism in a clearly delinated set of
constant features, it is not difficult to identify how neoliberal theories constitute the basis
for development policies and strategies. If every country is different and the process of
neoliberalization in each state can demonstrate remarkably rich details, with the most
basic feature of systematic usage of state power to impose market imperatives, the overall
picture is clear.185 Specifically, if markets do not exist in such fields as health care,
education, land, water or social security, the government is not only responsible for a
gradual establishment of a necessary structure for the markets, but also creates legal
structures and operations to guarantee the proper functioning of markets.186 However, the
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work of David Harvey and others makes it apparent that under neoliberalism the role of
the state must be kept to a bare minimum of creating and preserving an institutional
framework appropriate to neoliberal economic practices. 187 According to this view, the
main reason for developmental difficulties and slow economic growth has always been
the inefficient role of the state and public sector. Therefore, in order to reach the ultimate
goal of development through economic growth, it is necessary to rely on free market
forces rather than on state intervention.
Neoliberal theorists recognize that “The free market will on average allocate
resources much more efficiently than will the state, and this in turn will promote
economic growth.”188 Broadly speaking, neoliberalism places a particular emphasis on
the growth of a private sector which provides a higher level of accumulation of the
capital and holds that state has to be withdrawn from areas of social provision. Whether
there are better social welfare programs, laws that favor workers to join labor unions, or
higher taxes on the corporations, neoliberal ideology opposes almost any activity or
policy that can interact with or inhibit the free operation of markets.189 In this context, the
role of the state is reduced to the preservation of pro-market institutional structures. As
Wendy Larner points out, governments are now concerned with improving growth
performance and market competition, rather than developing and promoting of policies to
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guarantee a comprehensive social welfare system and full employment. 190 The economic
policy of neoliberalism lies primarily in its rejection of protectionism, which is regarded
as the main cause of an inefficient economy. Thus, proponents of the neoliberal approach
emphasize the importance of free markets, free trade and private property and believe that
state involvement in economic affairs should be limited as much as possible.
Is There a Difference? The Evolution of Liberalism
Speaking of neoliberalism as a set of market-liberal economic policies tended to
encourage the accumulation of capital and favoring laissez-faire economics, it is evident
that the use of the term neoliberalism in the context of political economy is very often
associated with the orthodox liberalism dated back to the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. There is no doubt that the basic principles of neoliberalism are built on the
doctrines of famous economists of classical liberalism such as Adam Smith, David
Ricardo and Jeremy Bentham who advocated for a minimal government intervention in
economic matters and believed that it could be mutually beneficial if societies are able to
trade freely with each other. It should be emphasized that liberal economists of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed that free market and open trade was the best
way for any economy to develop and thereby to coordinate human activity.
Nevertheless, while Smith in his book The Wealth of Nations strongly supported
free trade and explained how an unregulated market would naturally regulate itself via
the hidden hand of individual‟s rational behavior, this does not mean that Smith viewed
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the market “as a unilateral or unconditional policy.”191 Andrew Wyatt-Walter argues that
there is “a considerable danger in interpreting Adam Smith's views on international
relations” and makes it clear that for Smith government was necessary to protect society
against corruption and unfair competition, violence, injustice, inequality and
oppression.192 Moreover, being a great opponent of mercantilism, Smith accepted that the
market would not be able to provide public goods on their own, and consequently
government would need to provide public works and institutions for the benefit of the
general populace, not a specific group of people.193

Similarly, Noam Chomsky

emphasizes that at the heart of Smith‟s argument for free markets and free trade was
always a demand for government‟s just regulation in the interests of all people.194
Therefore, if Smith lived in our time and observed some of the typical manifestations of
neoliberalism, he would in all likelihood perceive them very strange and objectionable.195
The belief in the free market and market forces which has become a goal desired
for its own sake is one of the reasons to differentiate between neoliberalism and classical
liberalism.196 If classical liberalism concentrated on the importance of formal equality
among people, placed greater emphasis on social groups and showed concern over
unemployment and marginalization, neoliberal strategy of development places greater
emphasis on narrow self-interest rather than mutual interest, profit rather than progress,
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marketing and advertizing success instead of quality of the product. As Treanor
emphasizes, “A general characteristic of neoliberalism is the desire to intensify and
expand the market, by increasing the number, frequency, repeatability, and formalization
of transactions.”197 It is a modern neoliberal theory that declares every human behavior to
be grounded on maximizing material resources and public goods to be seen as individual
wealth.
Indeed, within neoliberal framework the interests of human beings are placed
above the interests and principles of community and society, justice and moral values. In
this context, Valentina Fedotova recognizes that while neoliberalism is reinforced by the
cynical references to teachings of Smith, it is so detached from his theory that it
completely distorts liberalism‟s leading principles.198 For Fedotova, such a deeply
religious man and truly virtuous representative of his time as Adam Smith could not put
the individual above society.199 While referring to the analysis of Smith‟s doctrine by
Andy Denis, Fedotova emphasizes that, according to Smith, wise and virtuous
individuals, trying to satisfy their own private interests, create an order around
themselves with respect to the social order of which they are a part.200
In Smithian economics, private incentives were always aligned with social costs
and benefits, which resulted in promotion of general welfare.201 Therefore, it should be
apparent that for Smith the good of the society was unconditional primacy which has to
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multiply the happiness of people. The emphasis on the idea that market economy
contributes to a socially beneficial equilibrium leads Chomsky to argue that the basic
ideas of orthodox liberalism are expressed not in the neo-classical or neoliberal theory
but in the concepts and practices of the libertarian socialist movements.202 Ultimately, it
should be clear that while the proponents of neoliberalism are convinced that they are
carriers of ideas of classical economic liberalism, neoliberalism violates the basic
principles of classical liberalism.
Much More Than Economic Theory
A scientific claim of human nature as wholly selfish and competitive forms any
basis of neoliberalism.203 The idea that human beings are essentially self-interested has
completely turned from scientific disposition into normative ethics which is structurally
fundamental for all political, social and economic decisions in market society. 204 For
neoliberals, every human being is an entrepreneur whose actions are motivated solely by
gaining material profits and maximizing their social status. 205 Furthermore, all forms of
relations, including relations between employees of one company are treated as sub-types
of market competition. Hence, all types of social relations are based on the market-driven
approach that claims that the usual purpose of human life is material acquisition. As
Patrick Fitzsimons writes, “individuals who choose their friends, hobbies, sports, and

202

Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order, 40.
Ted Lechterman, “Neoliberalism 101,” DisGuide 2008, 7 October 2007,
http://harvarddisguide.blogspot.com/2007/10/neoliberalism-101-by-ted-lechterman.html (accessed
December 8, 2010).
204
Ibid.
205
Ibid.
203

79

partners, to maximize their status with future employers, are ethically neoliberal.”206
Thus, while individual relations with one another are not necessarily monetarised, the
economic base of such relationship indicates at the “extension of the market principle
into non-economic area of life.”207
There is no difference between the market economy and market society.208
Consequently, it should be immediately apparent that neoliberalism is not simply the
approach to economics that subverts the bureaucratic government, stresses the
importance of free trade and enhances the role of the private sector. Neoliberalism is also
a modern version of social and political philosophy in which “the existence and operation
of a market are valued in themselves, separately from any previous relationship with the
production of goods and services.”209 More important, Henry Giroux suggests that
neoliberalism has to be understood not only as the politico-economic movement designed
to shift regulation of the economy from public to the private sector, but as a constructed
ideology that spreads out its reach to icorporate all aspects of pedagogical, social, cultural
and political life within the principles of a market society.210
Clearly, neoliberalism is not simply one of the most pervasive ideologies of the
twenty-first century, but something much more.211 Harvey provides a systematic
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overview over the development of neoliberalism and claims that in order to occupy a
commanding position in the global community, any economic doctrine or thought should
appeal to our values, aspirations, abilities and opportunities.212 He claims that the
founders of neoliberalism have used political ideals of individual freedom and human
dignity as the basis of neoliberal content. Since the concepts of freedom and dignity are
attractive to people in their own right, neoliberalism, through the rhetoric about the
individual liberty and freedom of markets, has become especially widespread and
successful after the wave of fascist and communist dictatorships.213
Neoliberals have maintained that government is the enemy of the people and have
fostered the illusion that the powerful state is responsible for all economic catastrophes.
According to neoliberals, the fall of communism provided us with evidence that the
command economy cannot be made to work.214 For the proponents of the neoliberal
project, the state‟s inefficiency to allocate resources is a problem of all countries, but in
the developing world where state officials are more likely to be corrupt it is a serious
headache.215 Therefore, it is agreed by neoliberals that economic development and
growth, associated with free market economy and free trade brings transparency, ensures
good governance and promotes democracy. With a conviction that economic growth and
profit-making are the fundamental principles of democracy, neoliberalism removes
government control of market forces and observes an aggressive individualism.216 Thus,
the pervasiveness of neoliberalism is evident by the claim of neoliberals that a process of
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economic liberalization is taking place alongside the concepts of human dignity,
democratization and individual freedom.
Nevertheless, while liberals of all types argue that economic liberalization leads to
political liberalization and eventually to democracy, neoliberalism as a theory does not
explain how a political system should be organized.217 Neoliberal philosophy remains
silent on whether or not a state should work either directly or through elected
representatives.218 Furthermore, Thorsen and Lie are clear that “If the democratic process
slows down neoliberal reforms, or threatens individual and commercial liberty, which it
sometimes does, then democracy ought to be sidestepped and replaced by the rule of
experts or legal instruments for that purpose.”219 Referring to Harvey, Thorsen and Lie
conclude that radical free market policies could be enforced under the patronage of
“autocrats as well as within liberal democracies.”220 More important, the designers of
neoliberalism initially distanced themselves from free market liberalism calling for some
government intervention to stimulate domestic economic growth. 221 Ultimately,
considering the plurality of views that has always existed within political and
philosophical camps, various communities of intellectuals have managed to develop a
plural set of ideas. In its turn, this has been constructed in quite diverse political systems
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which nowadays communicate the positions as both advocates and critics of
neoliberalism.222
While arguing that diverse political and economic paradigms only pretend to be
critical of neoliberalism, Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhoffer are clear that the main task of
neoliberalism is not to eliminate the state, but “rather to reduce its scope and redefine its
role vis-à-vis market.”223 Therefore, neoliberalism cannot be understood as a complete
political or economic theory or even a philosophy, but a plural set of concepts of how
“the relationship between the state and its external environment ought to be
organized.”224 Similarly, Wandy Larner argues that neoliberalism is a more complicated
occurrence which should be seen as a contemporary form of politico-economic
governance grounded on spreading of market relationships.225 More important, despite
the different interpretations of neoliberalism, most of the critics agree that neoliberalism
is a political and economic project of the trans-national upper class which under the mask
of attractive rhetoric shifts authority and wealth from the public sphere to private purse of
firms and corporations.226
D. About Capitalism
A Reformulation of Wallerstein's Framework
From the perspectives of Wallerstein‟s world-system approach, progress
associated with modernization theory is simply an illusion, and ideological models of
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development are necessary instruments for managing the global capitalist order. A worldsystem evaluation of the progress for poor and underdeveloped countries is completely
different from the idea that development and economic growth can be achieved through
overcoming autochthonous traditional values and social structures.227 Even more
important, the world-system approach rejects the alternate hypothesis, based on the
dependency theory, claiming that the pattern of growth and development experienced by
the advanced, high-consumption states would be a possibility on the account of internal
change to socialism as an alternative to capitalist economic system.
In his detailed studies of capitalism, Wallerstein continues the tradition of Marxist
sociology and political economy and advances a theoretical and historical account of the
origins and structure of the modern world-system as a capitalist world-economy.228
According to Wallerstein, capitalism is not simply an arrangement of economic relations
and legal norms, but an international system which has existed since the sixteenth century
with its own hierarchy. The capitalist world-system emerged in the late Middle Ages as a
result of the feudal crisis which threatened the ability of a privileged group of European
elites to extract surplus value from the direct producers and thereby determine the way of
socio-economic development.229 In fact, it is important to acknowledge that the capitalist
system has not been the first world-economy ever, but the first world-economy to survive
and to attain the phase of capitalist development where the whole world is operating
within the frame of institutionally stabilized hierarchical and geographically extensive
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social division of labor.230 Over the past five centuries, as Wallerstein writes, “the new
system consolidated itself in Europe and went on from there to take over the world, in the
process eliminating all alternative modes of social organization” and establishing new
institutional frameworks, new forms of production processes, and new modes of labor
control which have operated via mechanisms of market.231
The characteristic feature distinguishing Wallerstein‟s world-system analysis
from orthodox Marxism is a claim that the defining feature of capitalism is not a private
ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange of commodities in
markets, but constant maximization of production of surplus value, appropriated by the
capitalist class which employs wage workers in production to generate profit. Wallerstein
underlines that the fundamental force of the capitalist world economy is the “relationship
between capital/labor and the extraction of surplus created by direct producers (labor), or
by others (capitalists) either at the actual site of production or, later, when goods are
exchanged in the market place.”232 In other words, Wallerstein perceives capitalism as a
system whose existence is composed in continual and endless accumulation of capital,
meaning that “people and firms are accumulating capital in order to accumulate more
capital.”233 Because capital is accumulated by taking profits in the market, the key issue
for capitalists is the production of goods at the much lower price than that for which they
can be sold. By the logic of production, despite the continuous technological and
organizational improvements, labor costs represent a principal and increasing proportion
of the actual price for which services and products are sold.
230
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When labor costs rise and eventually become too high for capitalist entrepreneurs,
relocation of production to the places with historically lower salaries is an obvious
response to overcome obstacles of capital accumulation. Thus, the ongoing division of
labor of a capitalist global economy divides production into core-like, semi-peripheral
and peripheral goods and services and thereby leads to an unequal exchange of products
in such a way that there is “a constant flow of surplus-value from the producers of
peripheral products to the producers of core-like products.”234 In fact, arguing that the
segmentation of the world along the categorical boundaries and conceptual framework is
a function of the capitalist world system, Wallerstein explores inequality and uneven
development across societies through a world-wide division of labor with a structured
circle of production processes interacting with each other through the market.235
Briefly About Class, State and the Core/Periphery Hierarchy
In this regard, it is appropriate to underline that the major institutions of the
capitalist world-economy are markets, states, classes, households, and identities.236 As
Andrew Savchenko notes, “All of these are mere readjustments of the division of labor
within one giant capitalist enterprise.”237 Accordingly, this means that political and
economic forms of organization which are drawn into a single global system are
reciprocally connected and work to support a capitalist kind of social order.
While in the capitalist mode of production much of the surplus value takes the
form of material profit extracted from labor and taken by capitalists, it should be clear
234
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that there are two basic social classes which have different interests.238 Robinson refers
the concept of class to the “group of people who share a common relationship to the
process of social production and reproduction and are constituted relationally on the basis
of social power struggles.”239 In his work, Robinson especially deals with the issue of
global capitalism and the process of transnational class formation while arguing that
“class formation is an ongoing historical process and refers to changes over time in the
class structure of society, including the rise of new class groups and the decline of old
ones.”240 Therefore, drawing upon the orthodox Marxist thought, it makes sense to
conclude that “capitalism is characterized by a ruling class (bourgeoisie), which
owns/controls the means of production, and the working class (proletariat), who must sell
their labor to survive.”241 Furthermore, Robinson makes it clear that the comprehensive
study of the concept of class can involve an identification of different fractional interests
within each of the classes.242 While class analysis is complex, I argue that the study of
capitalist political economy and full understanding of capitalist society is impossible
without an analysis of class structure.
Overall, my point is that the conflict between various incompatible interests is
represented by the concept of class struggle and capitalism is an exploitative economic
system with its own tensions and struggles. Although my study does not directly focus
on the specific aspects of class structure, it does weigh heavily on the issues of
transnational class formation. What should be clear is that in the current phase of global
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capitalism, we are witnessing the process of transition from national to transnational class
formation. “As national productive structures become transnationally integrated, world
classes whose organic development took place through the nation – state are experiencing
supranational integration with „national‟ classes of other countries,” according to
Robinson.243 The emphasis here is that at the present time this process of transnational
class formation takes place through promotion of globalized consumerist culture,
ideology and institutional framework.
Within the Marxist tradition, the role of the state in the process of mediating a
conflict resulting from class struggle is extremely important. If for the realist thinkers, the
state is a sovereign actor representing the interests of the whole nation, in my study I
reject state-centrism and consider state as not the basic unit of the system of international
relations but as a constructed political organization which initially came into view at the
time of early capitalist development in Europe and was placed in a hierarchical order. As
Wallerstein notes, “The sovereign states became the primary political units organizing the
necessary flow of the factors of production” and enabling the extraction of surplus value
from wage labor in production activity via market mechanisms.244 Similarly, Savchenko
writes that “Nations and states are but a veil thrown by world capitalism onto its giant
mechanism for the extraction of surplus.”245 Therefore, the state system was structured
not only to ensure the transfer of surplus-value from direct producers to elite classes, but
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also to protect the interests of the dominant class and guarantee that society remains
disciplined and controlled.246
In this way, in order to maintain conditions favorable to economic growth and
secure the rule of capital, capitalist classes across nations cooperate with each other. This
means, in turn, that social relationships as well as inter-state relations are determined by
the structure of the capitalist economic system “which gives priority to the endless
accumulation of capital” and operates according to the principles of discrimination and
exploitation.247 In fact, the processes of oppression and manipulation are extremely
necessary for the capitalist socio-political and economic order as they contribute to
inequality which in its turn diminishes the number of the players in the capitalist system
and thereby restricts the range of interests.248
Being focused on the unlimited accumulation of capital as the main driving force
of the capitalist global economy, Wallerstein‟s world system-theory categorizes every
state in the world as capitalist. As part of the modern world system, no country has
developed in isolation and has had to accumulate capital in order to survive. In arguing
this way, Wallerstein flatly denies the widespread view that after the Second World War
there were two types of world system, known to us as socialist and capitalist.
Consequently, the assumption that Soviet Union has always been a fundamental part of
the capitalist world-economy allows us to “see beyond ideological labels and into the
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very nature of relations of production.”249 In this context, I agree with Andrew Linklater
who points out that it has always been crucial for the state to construct a national
ideology to incorporate the majority of the population and thereby to guarantee the
survival of capitalism.250 What Linklater‟s analysis brings out is the idea that the survival
of capitalism depends on multiple combinations of consent and coercion in which the
interests of the ruling class compromise with the demands coming from inferior social
forces. In other words, the dominant class is more likely to achieve its class goals under
the banner of popular interests.251
Similarly, Gill argues that “The central goal of socialism and social democracy
was not the replacement of capitalism, but civilizing the capitalist mode of
production.”252 Therefore, the logic of this thinking suggests that we look at the Soviettype economies in a different light and classify the Soviet-type economies as state
capitalism.253 In this regard, ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the
United States occurred in parallel with a conflict between classes within and across states
in the capitalist world-system.254 It also reflected the struggle for monopoly power within
the world-system both before and immediately after World War II. Gill is clear that after
the Wall Street crash in 1929 the world economy fragmented into economic blocs and the
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worldwide depression of the 1930s led to intensified class struggle between social forces
in favor of capital and against capital.255
While building on the classical Marxist idea that the relationships between
capitalists and working classes are characterized by unjust and exploitative nature,
Wallerstein divides the world into the most powerful states and those which are
dependent on them. In his conceptualization of global capitalist economy, scholar
ascribes the terminology of “core” and “periphery” to the states in terms of ownership
and production processes and calls the degree of profitability of the production activities
a “core-periphery relationship.”256 While less developed states are called periphery and
they are financially and technologically dependent on other actors of international
system, core states are those among major world powers with considerable military
strength and a high degree of autonomy. Worth mentioning is the fact that Wallerstein
assumes also the existence of states that have a relatively even mix of production of corelike and peripheral goods, and refers to them as to a “semi-periphery.” The major concern
of semi-peripheral states is to “keep themselves from slipping into the periphery and to
do what they can to advance themselves toward the core.”257
At the first glance, it might be tempting to think about the existence of semiperiphery as a model of economic success and as a result of modernization. However,
following Wallerstein, it is clear that some obvious countries to be labeled semiperipheral are necessary for the stabilization of the capitalist world-economy which is
achieved though the creation of the illusion of progress and elimination of unified
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opposition to core states. Therefore, the arrangement of the capitalist world-economy
consists of a tripartite division of labor which resulted in disproportionate exchange
favoring strong states and undermining the resource base of the weakest. Specifically,
weak states, in most cases, produce primary products like raw materials and supply
industrialized capitalists with productive and cheap labor. Major sectors of the peripheral
economies are organized in a way to serve the interests of the core states rather than to
meet the needs of the local population. In contrast, the strong states, while emphasizing
their role of guarding quasi-monopolies of the core-like production activity, “relate to
weak states by pressuring them to keep their frontiers open to those capital flows which
are useful and profitable to firms located in the strong states.”258 On this basis, the
formation of transnational class coalitions is extremely essential to the continuous
process of domination.259
The elites of the core pursue the integration of the intermediary constituents
within the ruling class of peripheral and semi-peripheral states into the structures and
processes of the capitalist world economy for the purpose of supporting the core‟s
economic domination and guarantee the rule of capital in particular.260 Furthermore, the
promotion of a stable form of world order is the ultimate goal of the alliance between the
ruling classes of the capitalist states. In this context, depending on the numerous
economic, political and geographic factors, the role of each state is very different.
However, once again, relations between states are structured hierarchically, and flow of
capital between those who are powerful and those who are poor is asymmetrical. In brief,
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the entire state structure of the capitalist world economy not only “maintains conditions
conductive to economic growth,” but also allows an unequal exchange of goods and
services in such a way that much of the surplus value obtained in the marginal areas of
the world-economy is transferred to the economically developed zones.261
While the proponents of dependency theory focus strictly on the concept of coreperiphery relationship, Wallerstein‟s world-system theory centers on the entire global
system currently functioning within the frame of a singular division of labor and
numerous cultural systems. The point is that if the dependency approach views the
positions of the states within the system of international relations as differentiated,
Wallerstein and other scholars who work under a world-system framework argue that the
set of circumstances for each state is hierarchically ordered and the possibilities open to
states for development or capital accumulation are “shaped by the cyclical and secular
evolution of the world system as a whole.”262 Peter Evans is clear that “Neither the
concrete forms of production associated with a given structural position, nor the
structural position assumed by a given nation” should be seen as fixed.263 It follows from
world-system theorists that hierarchy is absolutely essential and has to be maintained for
the continuation of a world capitalist economy, and “leaving one structural position
means taking on a new role in the overall division of labor, not escaping from the
system.”264
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For this reason, it should be pointed out that the relations within and between
states are in a constant conflict and disharmony which are rooted in the structural
relations of domination and dependence. The competition between various social forces,
rivalry between leading state actors, and the endeavors of peripheral or semi-peripheral
states to improve their status lead to an ongoing clash of interests, contradictions, and
tensions which eventually result in repressive relationships or direct conflicts.265 Clearly,
the hierarchical frameworks in which capitalist relations take place determine conflict as
a central and structural process in the capitalist world-system. It is not the anarchy of the
state system, as realists‟ claim, which is the major problem of international relations, but
rather the conflictual and repressive nature of the capitalist socio-political and economic
organization.266
E. Geoculture and Capitalism. Connection
What Is It All About?
On the basis of the previous section it is fair to say that an unjust social and
economic capitalist order is maintained and legitimized by a range of practices, belief
systems, institutions and ideologies. The combination of these elements helps to organize
relationships between states and classes, social movements and oppositional groups.267
This idea closely relates to the realist concept of hegemonic stability which claims that
the dominance of certain major states or one hegemonic state is necessary for the
international economic system to be more open and stable, or in our case, to legitimize
capitalist rule. As we already have seen, Wallerstein confirms this idea by claiming that
265
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besides states and inter-state system, the capitalist world-economy requires the
appearance of repeated and in most cases relatively brief hegemonic powers. 268 In fact,
scholars generally agree that when a dominant or hegemonic state is lacking in power,
economic stability is very difficult to maintain.
Nevertheless, if major approaches to international relations theory employ the
concept of hegemony to describe the power of a predominant state in the system of
international relations based solely on the military and economic component, building on
the ideas of Antonio Gramsci and on the works of leading critical theorists, I argue that,
in the modern capitalist world, hegemony in addition to military and economic status
should be viewed in terms of culture and ideology. Indeed, through culture and ideology
particular capitalist states and social forces define the rules of the game, exercise their
power, use it to assert authority and domination, and more importantly, to achieve the
endless accumulation of capital. This means that power of the ruling class and core states
does not consist only of violence and coercion, but also on consent and persuasion.
Such kind of hegemony at the international level demands “more than a single
balance of power or an order between states, since it also involves the complex patterns
of social relations which connect social classes in a range of countries.”269 As Gill writes,
global hegemony occurs when there is strong agreement between these social classes
across all levels. The scholar makes it clear that hegemony would be entirely
accomplished when the key institutions and socio-political and economic forms of
organization in addition to the vital values of the superior capitalist state develop into
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models for imitation in other peripheral and inferior states.270 Finally, the upshot of the
argument is that the international hegemony should not be viewed solely in a state-centric
terms, but needs to be seen as a system of rule premised upon ideas and cultural
apparatus which has for its origins the outward expansion of the power and influence of
the dominant capitalist groups in the leading capitalist states.271
According to the Gramscian analysis, hegemony is the consequence of struggle
between leading social classes. It is a situation under which sufficient levels of agreement
between classes that stand oppose to each other is reached. While hegemony is perceived
to be built on the active and broad measure of consent, “it functions according to basic
principles that ensure the continuing supremacy of leading social classes.”272 Thus,
hegemony is not based simply on consent, but on actively sympathetic agreement, in
which general populace wants what the ruling class requires. In a similar vein, Cohn
states that “A dominant class that rules only by coercion is not hegemonic in Gramscian
terms because its power does not extend throughout society and it can be overthrown
simply by physical force.”273 Cohn is clear that in order to maintain their power,
dominant social classes must gain consent of subaltern classes on the basis of common
material interests, ideas and shared values. In fact, hegemony involves not only
persuasion and legitimate forms of rule, but also should constitute a whole way of life.274
Thus, for the reason that hegemony seems to assume responsibility for not only a
peaceful order but a more favorable future for everybody, it is widely accepted by
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ordinary people.275 Thus, hegemony creates the kind of stability within which the
dominant ruling group legitimizes and maintains its power and thereby subordinates
social classes which, being unaware that they are oppressed, view the capitalist‟s
hegemony as perfectly legitimate.276
While acknowledging that societies are always to some extent undergoing forms
of structural change and transition and hegemony is a dynamic and continuous process,
both culture and ideology are, in themselves, powerful instruments working to support
and question the existing capitalist order.277 Wallerstein argues that the concepts of
culture and ideology should be seen as a system of values, rules and practices that
consciously and unconsciously manage social relations through encouragement and
penalties, and thereby create the system of illusions that persuade members of societies in
the legitimacy of a particular socio-political and economic order. In this context, Gill is
clear that in its negative usage, ideology represents the Marxist idea of false
consciousness and refers to the false and real interests of social classes.278
While at the level of domestic politics the hegemony of the capitalist bourgeoisie
operates through a variety of educational institutions, trade unions, political parties, and
associations, at the international level it performs through the international organizations
and more precisely through the outward spread of Western military, economic, political,
and cultural power. All these forces gradually inspire the masses to accept certain ideas
that justify the domination of the ruling class and represent their supremacy as natural
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and immutable. It is more important, however, to understand that that the main force
behind the spread of hegemony is an intellectual intelligentsia. Intellectuals, as Gramsci
argued, should be seen as the instruments for dominant social classes to provide the
consent of the general public. In the majority of instances, in the case of social conflict,
closely linked to the moral, intellectuals have to choose in favor of one side or the
other.279
Liberal Ideology as a Force to Discipline Labor
Despite the fact that a capitalist world-economy has been in existence since the
sixteenth century, its geoculture, which Wallerstein defines as a framework of beliefs and
values within which a capitalist world-economy operates, appeared in the wake of French
Revolution.280 Like any culture, the geoculture has developed and changed. The way in
which the shift of geoculture has occurred and will continue to do so is due to an
ideological orientation. Once again, ideology is not simply a set of ideas or theories, but a
systematic strategy in the social arena which anticipates “that there exist competing
groups with competing long-term strategies of how to deal with change and who best
should take the lead in dealing with it.”281 If before the French Revolution the dominant
group of people used the power of the state to force the subordinate group of people to
alienate control of labor power, after the period of radical social and political upheavals
in Europe a capitalist system of production started to be based upon the system of wage
payment. While referring to the analysis of capitalism by Nicos Poulantzas, Linklater
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emphasizes that because a capitalist system of production switched to the mode of
contract between the dominant and exploited class of people, capitalism applied ideas of
“freedom and equality” of all people and defended its claim to legitimacy in these liberal
concepts.282
Thus, it is appropriate to remember that in the capitalist global economy, the
entire system operates to keep out the majority of the population from the benefits of the
capitalist economic system “by including in the work-system in a layered hierarchy all
the worlds potential force.”283 In Wallerstein‟s words, “This system of exclusion via
inclusion was infinitely strengthened by the diffusion in the nineteenth century of a
dominant liberal ideology which justified this exclusion via inclusion, and managed to
harness even the world's antisystemic forces to this task.”284 It is evident from these
formulations that the concept of ideology should be understood as the reflection of the
worldview of the fraction of society which in most cases implies the negative aspect of
reproducing beliefs and values in other classes which serve to deprive their specific
interests.285 Futhermore, the point should be made that liberalism, being composed of
political extremes between which liberal ideology falls, has always sought to define the
political scene and has been the central system of principles and beliefs of the capitalist
geoculture.286
As Wallerstein argues, liberalism was the predominant ideology during two
centuries from 1789 to the year of 1989, the same time that so called Communism and an
282
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ideological force of Marxism-Leninism collapsed. Accordingly, during this period of the
triumph and collapse of liberalism as the hegemonic ideology, the reality of ideological
consensus stood behind the mask of ideological conflict from which one can draw certain
conclusions. Worth noting that for Wallerstein, a great ideological antinomy of the
twentieth century between Wilsonianism and Leninism was constructed as a mechanism
for the political integration of the periphery and semi-periphery into the capitalist worldsystem and to shift the industrialized production of goods and services into those less
developed zones.287 At first glance, it might be tempting to think about the rivalry of two
ideological doctrines as real and intense, however, according to Wallerstein, the
proponents of both doctrines had very similar beliefs and ideas regarding economic and
politic arenas.288
In brief, the idea of proletarian insurrection against the bourgeoisie degenerated
into the theory of anti-imperialism and turned into support for nationalist and liberation
movements which were only an expression of classical liberal presuppositions.289 Thus,
according to Wallerstein, Leninism, being a great adversary of liberal-socialism at the
national arena, resembled the liberal socialism at the international level.290 Clearly, a
consequence, promised by both ideologies of Wilsonianism and Leninism was “closing
the gap between the rich countries and poor.”291 As a result, the entire system of
nationalist regimes was established in order to move along the path of decolonization and
national development which was defined as following the advice of either the West or the
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East, and eventually to “catch up.” It should be pointed out that while there were
differences between Wilsonian and Leninist ideological canons about the road to selfdetermination of the peoples of the peripheral zones, decolonization was the fundamental
task for them. Therefore, to explore further, Wallerstein makes it clear that “with the
ideologies elaborated and constrained, with the antisystematic movements channeling the
energies of discontent,” all sociopolitical strategies, decisions and knowledge are the
powerful force to ensure that the power and value of geoculture lies in its theoretical
apparatus.292
F. Conclusion
Although it may seem logical to argue that a balance-of-threat theory provides the
most convincing explanation of why certain Ukrainian elites want to join NATO, it is
quite unwise not to refer to economic and sociological approaches that contribute to our
understanding of the issue of Ukraine‟s joining NATO. If in the previous chapter I
generally demonstrated that incorporation of Ukraine into NATO would increase the
security risks of the Alliance members and at the same time would not produce net
security benefits for Ukraine, in this chapter I show that neoliberal principles, values,
rules and norms of socio-economic and political order are one of the most important
factors in further NATO enlargement in Eastern Europe. While the balance-of-threat
approach to NATO enlargement explains the motivation of Ukrainian policymakers for
their interest in NATO membership because of fear of a future Russian threat, “it cannot
account for NATO‟s enlargement decisions.”293 True, NATO‟s further Eastern
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enlargement and bringing Ukraine into Alliance are neither efficient nor necessary to
increase the security of old members of the Alliance and cannot address the security
problems in post Cold War Europe.
If we perceive Russia as a potential threat we focus our attention on the Russian
power and its offensive capabilities, it becomes clear that Russia cannot pose a threat to
either old or new members of the Alliance.294 The point is that the political rhetoric
around the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO is overblown and is used
instrumentally to represent the arguments of the pro-NATO forces as “legitimate and to
persuade the audience of the legitimacy of their claims in order to elicit political support
and induce political cooperation.”295 According to Schimmelfening‟s analysis of NATO
enlargement process, the proponents of Ukraine‟s NATO integration use arguments,
based on notions of security and stability, “to shame the opponents into compliance” and
to mobilize social pressure through manipulation of public opinion. 296
The discussion in this chapter contributes to the argument that an attempt to turn
Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine‟s security concerns, but by strong
Western interests, especially economic. Very clearly, Ukraine is in the periphery of the
global capitalist system. Ukrainians live under poor socio-economic conditions not
because they are worse or less intelligent than Westerners, but because Ukraine is at the
bottom
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the

global surplus value and capital accumulation takes place.297 The achievement of a
greater competitive advantage for Ukraine under the conditions of globalization is
possible only through increased exploitation and a further decline in living standards of
Ukrainians.298
What I am getting at is the fact that Ukrainian society has become increasingly
class divided around national circuits of accumulation, and social power struggle is a
predominant locus of contemporary Ukraine. In its turn, powerful economic forces under
the banner of globalization and international cooperation not only redefine and reinforce
the relations between social classes and groups within Ukraine, but construct the basis for
the incorporation of Ukrainian capitalist class into transnational structure. Therefore, it is
crucial to understand that the issue of Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO should be
regarded as a part of the processes of consolidation of neoliberal capitalism and
transnational class formation.
While arguments between markets versus state positions have always been central
ideological themes of policy-making process in different time and various states, I argue
that ideological disputes between various development doctrines, models and theories are
operating within the frame of a single capitalist system.299 In fact, fostered by neoliberal
economists, another kind of modernization theory has become dominant, according to
which every country needs to introduce and advance neoliberal reforms, which boil down
to complete privatization, deregulation of prices with national currencies, and promotion
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of free competition. In this light, promotion of democracy is one of the main priorities at
which the project of neoliberalism aims and such organization as NATO has been
transformed to defend that kind of democracy.
One should not miss the point that the basis of the neoliberal political program has
become a consensus of the rulers and the ruled which consists of the need for mass
participation in the political process. It is important to underline that the consolidation of
so called democratic procedures for decision making and consolidation of neoliberal
economic reforms are closely intertwined with each other. In essence, the process of
openness and democratization advances the cause of commitment to promote a difficult
economic policy reforms, contributing to economic growth over the longer run, by
exposing the inefficiencies of authoritarian rule to competitive politics.300 Specifically,
through exploitation of crisis conditions and managing opposition, new democratic
governments initiate economic reform policies. But is it a democracy when two or three
identical political parties with almost the same political agendas, dispensed with
enormous financial resources, share the power and regularly replace each other on the
governmental positions? Is there a presence of a civil society in which ethnic politics is
organized, competitive and linked to party politics?301
Elections have become rituals around the world and the development of stable
politics and the free market economy in the countries of the former Soviet Union has
become a strategic goal for the Western governments.302 The illusion of democracy takes
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away the right from the people to make even simple political or economic decisions, and
namely NATO contributes to the complete liquidation of the meaning of the people as the
source of power. The case of the Ukrainian government‟s determination to intensify
cooperation with NATO, without taking notice of the people of Europe's second largest
country, proves the correctness of the words stated above.
Not only neoliberal policies such as trade liberalization and privatization
accompany the process of democratization, but also, in the case of failed states, the
humanitarian interventions are applied.303 In this respect, it is appropriate to comment
Gramsci that any radical change or action should be preceded by the consent and
hegemony. For example, today political leaders are able to achieve through democratic
consent what Pinochet succeeded to achieve through state violence in Chile. The ideas of
individualism, freedom and democracy have become globally spread and the economic
stagnations have been interpreted as a crisis of governance. Therefore, if in the 1950s and
1960s the argument was made that democracy would follow development as a result of
economic growth and political modernization, in the 1990s it became clear that
democratization has become one of the essentials for the promotion of free market
policies and consequently economic growth.304
Finally, this chapter has called attention to the idea that the consensus around the
democratic norms and consumerism in today‟s globalized world is the structural power of
increasingly united global elite to enforce discipline through the market. As Robinson
notes, “The shift from authoritarianism to polyarchy as the dominant form of political

303
304

Ray Kiely, Empire in the Age of Globalization (Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005), 134.
Ibid., 133.

105

authority in much of the world represents a shift from coercive to consensual forms of
social control at the transnational level.”305 Clearly, at a time when the debate concerning
the issue of theoretical foundations of neoliberalism deepens, neoliberalism violates all
the principles of liberalism, which supposedly made it a slogan. While the neoliberal
ideology demonstratively refers to all kind of liberties and human rights, in reality it
brings out the interests of the mega capital forces.306 In this context, Wallerstein is
completely right in claiming that liberalism had collapsed. Nevertheless, it is wise to
remember that while some are saying that the history of liberalism and capitalism has
ended, neoliberalism has triumphed precisely in its most radical liberal forms both at
practice and at the level of ideology. Neoliberal capitalism has become not simply a more
prevalent force in contemporary human lives, but a unique and uniform global system of
beliefs and values.
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V. THE EXPANDING ROLE OF NATO - FROM DEVELOPMENT TO GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE?
A. Argument
In this chapter I demonstrate that the extension of NATO should be seen as an
extension of multiple forms of power, and the issue of Ukraine joining Euro-Atlantic
Alliance should be examined in the context of the U.S. state‟s interests alongside
capitalist systematic interests and values. I view the process of NATO expansion as the
maintaining of America‟s grand strategy of openness that “derives directly from U.S.
principles and practices elaborated and implemented during and even before the Cold
War.”307 The argument I develop below considers NATO expansion nothing more than
the extension of the Monroe Doctrine to the post-Soviet space which aims at the
consolidation of free market reform, and thereby moves forward commercial interests.
It should be obvious that NATO should be regarded as a multilateral organization
whose evolution has been connected with the development of modern capitalism. To be
precise, in the second half of the twentieth century the capitalist world, under the banner
of decolonization and the guidance of the Bretton Woods system, entered the new phase
of the process of accumulating power in which international institutions, working under
the influence of the U.S. political establishment, have devoted themselves to the
reconstruction of the bureaucracies of the Third World and transforming government
policies

to serve the interests of the rich states and maintain their dominance. 308
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be simply regarded as a military institution, but as one of the central institutional
instruments at the disposal of Western policymakers to ease the transition of post-Soviet
countries into a full-fledged market economy.
B. From Colonialism to International Regulation
Steans and Pettiford correctly point out that Wallerstein‟s world systems approach
provides us a possibility to look in an entirely different light on the concept of economic
development and the process of decolonization.309 In fact, any logical attempt to
understand the operation of the global capitalist economy must include an analysis of
decolonization as one of two main geopolitical events in the post-Second World War
period that has allowed massive expansion and further development of capitalism.310
Based on Wallerstein‟s analysis, Steans and Pettiford suggest an idea that the end of
colonialism cannot be seen as indicating the end of oppression and exploitation of the
poor, agricultural states by industrialized and developed nations. Scholars recognize that
the formal end of colonialism simply transforms the nature of colonialism from a direct
type, based on military occupation, to an indirect form based on economic arrangements
and production of knowledge.311 The fundamentals and instruments of the neo-colonial
policies have become loans, different types of financial and political assistance provided
through foreign and national companies.312
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In this context, I argue that colonialism should not be seen simply as an
uncultivated method of military and political domination of the peoples of the nonWestern world by European powers, but as a necessary measure of capitalist economic
system to extend the global market and to provide the access to the resources of cheap
labor, land and raw materials. It was only after successfully engaging indigenous
populations to the civilized world, which destroyed their traditional way of life and
imposed Western values, when the promotion of state sovereignty along with capitalist
expansion took place.313 The declaration of independence of former colonies did not
mean to guarantee complete sovereignty of young states. On the contrary, through joining
the United Nations and other international institutions former colonies have been
integrated into the political and bureaucratic systems of the metropolitan structure. In
essence, having become tightly attached to capitalism, peoples of the former colonies did
not have any choice, but to follow the development strategies of the West, directed at the
restructuring of class relations. This resulted in accelerated integration of the workingclass masses, exchange markets on a global basis and internationalization of production.
Post-war Keynesian Consensus
There cannot be any room for doubt that institutional transformations that have
their origins in the West and the development of modern capitalism are coincidental and
interconnected processes. As Harvey confirms, “the restructuring of international
relations after the Second World War was designed to prevent a return to the catastrophic
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conditions that had threatened the capitalist order in the period of the 1930s.”314 In
particular, with the decolonization of much of the Third World a new hegemonic world
order based upon the regulation of inter-state conflict along with globally conceived civil
society has started to form.
For Mann as for Wallerstein, decolonization means largely the process which
“ended segmentation of the world economy into separate imperial zones,” and has been
typically tied to capitalist development and industrialization.315 While prior to the Second
World War there were multiple dominant centers of capitalism operating on the global
scale, after 1945 there was a shift towards a more simple, a collective center of the world
capitalist system.316 According to Samir Amin, the new collective center and expansion
of capitalism has become the ensemble of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
Therefore, the role of the United States as a hegemonic power should be situated in its
relation with this collective center of the capitalist world system.317 Furthermore, the
political and social changes since the Second World War signify the development of a
neoliberal movement inside a segregate worldwide domain of elite consensus
arrangement.318
Based on Gramscian concept of “passive revolution,” it is argued that the post1945 world order was reformed to establish advanced methods of capitalist production
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worldwide and to consolidate ruling capitalist class.319 The term “passive revolution”
refers to the process of gradual transformation of socio-political and economic order in
the way to legitimize the rule of the leading capitalist forces. 320 Therefore, it is necessary
to emphasize that while the Bretton Woods system aimed to spread the principles of free
market internationally and encourage open competition, it allowed governments to
intervene in the domestic economy to pursue full employment and prevent disruptive
capital flows. Thus, the Bretton Woods system should be seen as an international
economic order in which the general fundamentals of liberalism were “embedded.”
Overall, as Cohn summarizes, “Policies to promote openness in the global economy
included measures to cushion domestic economies, and policies to provide domestic
stability in turn were designed to minimize interference with expansion of the global
economy.”321 In other words, in the absence of capitalist hegemony, comprehensive and
slower transformation of the socio-political and economic order in the form of Fordist
production and Keynesian macroeconomic management took place.
Awakened by the oppressiveness of politico-economic and social orders, former
colonial states were encouraged by the Western countries to develop capitalist economies
through engaging in free trade enterprise. This advancement of market mechanisms in the
developing world was believed not only to put an end to the backwardness of the peoples,
but more important, to ensure that Third World states did not fall into the hands of
socialist regimes. Paul Baran is clear that while “the military performance of the Soviet
Union during the war and the rapid recovery of its war-ravaged economy provided the
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final proof of the strength and viability of a socialist society”, in the context of the Cold
War, the United States and other Western capitalist countries were put in fear of “the
spectacular advance and expansion of the world‟s socialist camp.”322 Therefore, the idea
of economic growth and modernization as an outcome of power politics won backing
from across the political and economic spectrum in the newly independent and less
developed countries.
The end of the Second World War brought changes in the conceptual
development doctrine.323 Rather than emphasizing spontaneous development from below,
development and progressive social change has come to be associated with
Westernization, or more accurately, Americanization. After the victory over fascism, the
idea that the United States is the source of modernity has started to spread out from a
Western core to the rest of the world. In fact, the Fordist form of production, the
democratic form of state and the American form of civil society have become models to
follow throughout the world.324 However, despite the increasing power of financial
markets and determination of the neo-classical liberal views, only a few countries
followed the approach of the completely unregulated market economy.325
Although the postwar international economic architecture owed much to the
laissez-faire doctrine of orthodox liberals, the ideas of John Keynes on international and
national economic planning had a significant impact on the post-war economic thought.
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While neoclassical liberal architects of the post-war institutional order argued that capital
controls contributed to the 1930s Great Depression and consequently to World War II,
Keynesian economists believed that a self-regulating market was to be blamed for those
disasters.326 Speaking in favor of increases in spending on social programs by state,
followers of Keynesianism promoted the idea of government‟s intervention in the process
of production and distribution to protect the economy from the influence of the capitalist
cycle. Despite the clash of economic ideas and ideologies, post-war architects came to a
compromise and designed the international economic framework on the basis of
interventionist liberal policies. Taking into account the social turmoil against unrestrained
market forces and the threat of continued class struggle, this kind of strategy was
believed to be one of best choices to stimulate aggregate demand and stabilize capitalist
society.327
If economic growth became conceived as the primary criterion of development, it
had to be accompanied by the establishing of Western policies which promote
privatization and deregulation, consolidate democracy and encourage trade and capital
market liberalization. It became widely believed that political institutions along with
economic growth were the main policy objectives that are the necessary for moving an
economy of the state out of negative macroeconomic indicators into a positive.328
According to Steans and Pettiford, “International institutions were thought to be
increasingly necessary as a complement to states, whose individual capabilities to deal
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with problems generated by new technologies were decreasing.”329 While arguing that
various kinds of institutions and agencies in different ways shape social, political and
economic behavior, William Garside is clear that there has emerged a general consensus
among modern economists that only through the complex system of international
institutions, both formal and informal, the invisible hand of the market can perform well
and eventually lead to economic growth.330 If, according to a liberal perspective, preWorld War II economic rules and institutions were weak and disruptive, the agreements
laid down at Bretton Woods in 1944 established a new framework for international peace
and cooperation which consisted of three international economic institutions – the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
For liberal thinkers, these institutions have been part of a complex structural
framework and have played a crucial role in determining not only the post-war world
economy, but also global peace and justice. In fact, the liberal study of international
interdependence emphasized that institutionalized application of market principles would
allow all human beings to enjoy the benefits of material progress equally. By rejecting an
assumption that conflict between states is natural, liberals argued that these new forms of
international political organization were necessary to manage both social and economic
relations. For example, while one of the main functions of the Bretton Woods system was
to avoid the competitive devaluation of currencies, “the IMF was created to monitor a
system of pegged or fixed exchange rates, in which each currency had an official
329
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exchange rate in relation to gold or the U.S. dollar.”331 In contrast to the IMF‟s ability to
make short-term loans for the purpose of maintaining the pegged exchange rates, the
IBRD or World Bank has been able to help countries (first Europe, then developing) with
long-term loans needed for the various reconstruction projects. In sum, the predominant
conviction of liberal thinkers after the Second World War was that the cause of the war
was the economic breakdown, and thereby the main purpose of the Bretton Woods
system was to promote economic growth and development by providing a secure
structure for economic activity.332
Obviously, the idea that institutions are the rules of the game that shape the longterm performance of economies has a long history. It is commonly associated with the
name of Adam Smith who believed that favorable results can be obtained from
decentralized institutions rather than centralized initiatives.333 However, the conservative
school of neoliberal economic theory interpreted the Bretton Woods agreements, which
originally sided with interventionist policies, very differently. 334 The years of the postwar American economic boom suspended Keynesian economic doctrine, based on the
idea of a governments‟ having a responsibility to provide steady economic expansion,
jobs and increasing standards of living, with the shortage of effective demand.335
To be sure, the demand on the part of U.S. businesses significantly contributed to
the persistence of the belief that only the unfettered market can guarantee the best
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distribution of income and is the most effective instrument to foster economic
development and social progress. Furthermore, when the U.S. economy was the largest
and most powerful economy in the world, conservative neoliberal economics otherwise
known as the Chicago School became highly influential and emphasized those aspects of
the Bretton Woods agreements while favoring the U.S. interests and policies.336 Not only
did the United States favor rules and norms for the conduct of postwar economic
relations, but the U.S. dollar served as its major trading currency. Therefore, due to
economic expansion and to enormous investments of the U.S. into Europe, provided by
the Marshall Plan, the U.S. managed to occupy a hegemonic position and assumed the
increasing responsibility for the capitalist stability in the world.337
Towards Neoliberal Hegemony
It is essential to understand that mainly because of the United States‟ replacement
of British hegemony over the capitalist world economy the nature of global capitalism
has become quite different to that before the World War II. If there have been always
hegemonic powers in the history of the modern world-system such as Spain, Portugal,
United Provinces and the United Kingdom, the influence of the United States in the
current capitalist order cannot be compared to that of any other mentioned above. 338 The
establishment of the Bretton Woods institutions and the shift to the role of the dollar as
the international reserve currency has allowed the United States to obtain an economic
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capability that was unparalleled.339 Furthermore, while claiming to foster liberty and
prosperity, the United States evolved into the center of the world politics and culture.340
It was only after the Second World War, when U.S. recognized the reality of
power relations in the world order and has started to intensively promote the ideal of
itself as a model for the rest of the world.341 To be sure, the U.S. support for the
Wilsonian ideals of self-determination, national sovereignty and democracy has won
support for the power of the United States and has inspired progressive elements in many
societies to affiliate with these ideals and seek closer ties with the United States.342
Consequently, being the only industrial power that after the World War II possessed the
diplomatic, economic and military strength, the United States initiated the process of
shaping and managing postwar international relations according to America‟s ideas,
practices and domestic interests. Finally, when economic, political and military center of
world capitalism shifted to the United States, its longtime imperial aspirations for
geopolitical expansion have found a renewed strength.
The United States was committed to support the democratic development of
societies. In order to secure its interests and solve the crisis of capital accumulation it
launched the project of development. The case of post-World War II institutional
transformation and construction of rules and regulations for the primacy of moving
forward domestic interests of the Unites States is explained by Lipshutz, whose analysis
has been associated with the notion of imperium as a heteronymous system subject to the
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regulations originating from the single configuration of power and authority. 343 Lipshutz
is among those who argue that foreign policy of the United States should be viewed as an
extension of its domestic commercial orientation. According to Lipshutz, the main reason
for the United States to pressure European allies to grant their colonies independence and
foster the process of national awakening was economic. Therefore, the post-war world
order that was supposed to be built around the legitimacy of democracy and selfdetermination was dictated by the commercial development and crave of the U.S.
capitalist industrial system to capture markets, spheres of influences and capital
investment. Clearly, the U.S. support for the right of self-determination was not based on
the notions of fairness and idealism, but because of comprehensive planning and
calculation that the end of European colonial rule was likely to extend its own power in a
post-war world-system.344
In the Cold War context and in the fear of being confronted against the forces that
contributed to the erosion of European colonialism, the United States through the
involvement of social scientists have managed to establish a universal view of human
nature and produced core concepts and problem definitions with which global community
should operate. As Michael Latham emphasizes, “responding to a perceived Communist
threat in the midst of a collapsing European colonial order” a broad range of American
scholars developed a modernization theory explaining why some countries succeeded in
their economic development while others had not.345 Therefore, while modernization
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refers to radical changes in political structures, social values and economic organization,
it should be viewed as an ideology aiming to transform the world in the ways in which
the security of the capitalist world would not be challenged.346
To be sure, Latham refers to modernization as a conceptual structure that clearly
states “a common collection of assumptions about the nature of American society and its
ability to transform a world perceived as both materially and culturally deficient.” 347 In
fact, the emphasis should be made that the process of modernization mostly meant the
adoption of Western technology, development of an independent mass media and
acceptance of Western culture and products, values of efficiency and professionalism.348
In this context, Gill is clear that precisely the “outward expansion of the United States has
also served to foster the values of consumerism and possessive individualism, so that
increasing proportions of the populations of, for example, Third World states have come
to identify with American culture.”349 Thus, vision of the entire world started to be
transformed by Western techniques and institutions according to American model.
Although in the previous chapter I examined the socio-political and economic
aspects of development process, the main focus of the modernization theory has been a
set of individual characteristics considered as necessary to economic growth and
progress.350 While non-Western societies through its entire history felt a prejudice against
profit, commerce, speculative investment and interest, these elements were encouraged to
achieve a rising of standards of living and for the reconstruction of economies. Acting in
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a self-interested way has started to be seen as a necessary to the social progress and
development.351 From the modernization perspective, the only guarantee of progress is
the cultivation of individuals with modern values, and having a state structure conducive
to the development of free trade and commerce.352 Thus, economic growth has started to
be considered as the work of rational and enterprising individual. In other words, “In the
modernization school of thought, the individual is the center of social analysis and in
many ways the sole reality, with society, state, and other forms of collective being.”353
This viewing of progress via the individual behavior has been applied by knowledgeable
experts and international institutions on the entire underdeveloped world.
The general point is that in the predominant and mainstream Western political
culture, resistance to the American expectation and position has been always judged to
arise from the backwardness of the people, while support of Washington‟s policies has
been regarded equivalent to democratic thinking and behavior.354 Of course, the
improvements of the infrastructure, the accelerated spread of consumerism, technological
innovation and industrialization have created feeling and belief in progress.355 In fact, an
important aspect of modernization has always been its simultaneous benefit to the welfare
of the underdeveloped state and highly industrialized capitalist economy. Nevertheless,
there should be clarity about the benefit in the relationship between the kind of postcolonial state, serving the interests of capitalist marketing network, and economically
developed and dominant nations, supplying with power, wealth and privilege a corrupt
351
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national elite that forfeits the well-being and dignity of the ordinary people.356 The
demand for mutual benefit has depended on a level of threat to the capitalist elites of the
globalized world and thereby “on an assertion of central imperial control.”357
For the U.S. political establishment, the rhetoric of self-determination,
democracy, rule of law, anticommunism and human rights has been nothing else than a
convenient instrument to arrange the structure of global capitalism in a way to converge
with the U.S. interests. The pro-freedom and pro-justice slogans have had to grapple
more with human consciousness than the physical structure and have worked to becloud
the material quality of capitalist imperialism.358 Therefore, it should be immediately
apparent that development as a largely national process has resembled the processes of
colonial civilizing in which “a puppet ruler is installed, a native mercenary army hired to
fight, and western troops sent to crush rebellious tribesmen who refuse to follow the
diktat of the imperial power.”359 In this context, various and influential accounts that
identify development with civilization, progress and modernization have been
instruments of exploitation and oppression in the hands of capitalist forces. 360
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C. The Consolidation of Neoliberal Hegemony
Once Again, Crisis as a Starting Point
Through the early 1970s, partly because of the socio-political responses to the
effects of World War II, neoliberal doctrine hid under the umbrella of government policy.
However, despite that modification, it is important to underline that the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates, capital controls and multilateral institutions “between the
end of the Second World War and the start of the 1970s” allowed the largest development
of productive structures and expansion of global economy in history. 361 One of the
reasons for such change is the fact that “the crisis of the post-war order accelerated the
shift from Fordism to post-Fordism - from economies of scale to economies of
flexibility.”362 In other words, “the large integrated plant employing large numbers of
semiskilled workers on mass-production of standardised goods became an obsolete model
of organisation.”363 This has significantly strengthened the power of capital within the
production process and caused business to become less controllable by state authority.364
Thus, while in the first half of the twentieth century liberal capitalism was interested in
strengthening the role of the state to benefit corporations with legal privileges, tax
benefits and financial investments, since the last decades of the twentieth century, the
transnational corporations, through the implementation of neoliberal ideology, have been
weakening the state and insisting on privatization of state enterprises.
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The incorporation of monopolies in the production and financial sector has
resulted in their taking over the state and turned for the world domination. In 1973, the
switch to market-determined free exchange rates along with the oil price shock and
subsequent prolonged international recession created favorable conditions for political
leaders and leading economists to further push the free market ideology over Keynesian
compromise. Slower rates of growth, intense social movements and high inflation across
the world “laid the basis for the liberalization of finance and important changes in U.S.
economic policy, which led to increased bank lending to the developing world in the
1970s.”365 As a result, during the 1980s, being encouraged by Western banks to borrow,
developing states were confronted with enormous debts and interest payments. Therefore,
the resulting defaults and control of inflation helped to push further the agenda for a
revived political approach which eventually came to be recognized as neoliberalism.366
Ironically, the role of the IMF increased again. As Michael Barnett and Martha
Finnemore stressed, “It has become very active in reconfiguring domestic political and
business institutions of all kinds, advising countries on appropriate configurations of
everything from their social spending to their stock markets and banking sectors.”367 For
Barnett and Finnemore, the IMF started to intervene in member‟s income, labor,
monetary, environmental and fiscal policies in ways generally rejected by its original
architects. Barnett and Finnemore are clear that “The Fund moved from a limited focus
on balance-of-payments lending to ever more sweeping structural interventions in
member‟s economies and societies in an attempt to control activities that might contribute
365
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to stabilization.”368 Nevertheless, the IMF‟s critics argue that these structural adjustment
programs have not been merely a remedial package for stabilization and economic
growth, but part of a scheme directed to reconstruct economies of the developing states
according to the free market model.
There cannot be any doubts that through the IMF‟s package of neoliberal
structural adjustment policies as a condition for loans, neoliberalism, has imposed its
market values and economic regime on weaker states.369 Neoliberal policy prescriptions
imposed by the international agencies have forced developing states “to open their
frontiers by lifting import and export restrictions, to remove price controls and state
subsidies, to enforce rapid privatization or divestiture of all or part of state-owned
enterprises, to implement user fees for basic services such as education and health and to
cut social expenditures.”370 Thus, the widespread consensus in favor of economic
liberalization was reached not only because of the failure of state interventionist policies
during the period from the World War II through the 1980s, but as a result of intense
campaign to spread a belief in the free market as the most effective way to foster
economic growth and development by powerful international institutions such as the IMF
and World Bank and known as the “Washington Consensus.”
Under the regimes of Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s undiluted neoliberal
dogma rose to dominance and stimulated the spread of “transnational corporations, the
expansion of foreign direct investment and the interpenetration of capital.” 371 The
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principal assertions of this dogma have become the ideas that “states should leave
economies to the efficiencies of market forces” and were required to adopt such policies
as free trade and privatization, deregulation and foreign investment.372 Hence, states
became more accountable to business corporations rather than to the public. In fact, the
role of state is now limited to that of a regulator of contracts between individuals and
companies, and mediator of the conflict resulting from the class struggle.
Therefore, the 1970s and 1980s have been characterized by the shift away from an
international world order of sovereign states towards transnational liberal economic order
in which multinational corporations have started to dominate.373 The key to the above
developments have been a profound “changes in communication, information and
transportation technologies that now enabled production to be globally parceled out.”374
This in turn has allowed the relocation of the capitalist industrial production and
eventually constituted the basis of a renewed cycle of capital accumulation, that is
nowadays called globalization.
Project of Neoliberal Globalization
Though the relationship between the extension of neoliberalism and the process of
globalization is vitally important, there is no doubt that both are tightly connected to the
relationship of Western power.375 The concept of globalization has been used by free
market theorists as liberalization and has been referred to as an accelerated integration of
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many local economies into one global market.376 In this context, Kiely denies the
assertion that contemporary globalization arrived from nowhere and claims that it should
be seen as an outcome of the transition from a Keynesian to a neoliberal form of
capitalism.377 Moreover, Keily is clear that in the process of transition and further
extension of globalization the United States played a central role.378 Therefore, in spite of
its new terminology, globalization is the formation and the outcome of a far longer
intellectual history of promotion of markets for goods and for consolidating the global
population in compliance with the forces operating in the free-market based capitalism.379
If globalization began in the end of nineteenth century due to the military power
and eventually slowed down during the interwar period, “in the late twentieth century,
economic instruments, competition and cooperation” intensified and further extended the
process of globalization.380 Current globalization is of a new kind; it is not English, but
Anglo-American.381 To be precise, the crucial aspect of globalization is the
comprehensive diffusion and supremacy of American capital and power.382 Just as the
products of the United States have overflowed global markets since the post-World War
II, American culture is now suffusing every continent.383 People everywhere are exposed
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to the values of the United States as never before. U.S. brands are not simply selling
products, but also a life-style.384 Furthermore, according to Robinson, “the global cultural
icons symbolize the domination of a particular corporate capitalist culture.”385 We are
witnessing how the U.S. political and business leaders, with the broad support of society,
are imposing on the entire world the idea that American neoliberal values are universal
and undeniable because they form the basis of civilization. Therefore, the consequences
of a never-ending process of accumulating power and wealth, globalization should be
referred to as an acceleration and triumph of the integrated capitalist system.386 At the
same time, it should be obvious that the defining feature of the current capitalist epoch is
the rise of transnational capital which aims at dominating the global market and generates
pressures for cultural and political activities, with intense consequences for power
relations.387 The spread of neoliberal knowledge structure has resulted in the further
expansion of investments and markets, cutting the state sector and destruction of rights of
indigenous peoples.
Although the interconnectedness of individuals, groups and countries has existed
for centuries and the increasing integration through trade has been a key characteristic of
the global economy since the Second World War, namely the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the position of the United States as the leading beneficiary of the information
revolution have leaded to the “spectacular growth in intensity, scope and visibility of
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globalization as a public issue.”388 The Soviet Union fell and with it a new unipolar
world, dominated by one master unchecked by any rival, was born. Having “conquered”
and having put under the control the entire Western hemisphere, the United States
received a green light for the access to the market of the post-Soviet republics that
resulted in openness of the former communist state to American influence and power.
The lack of prevalent strategic and ideological threat gave the United States free hand to
pursue its foreign policy based on its interest.389 At the same time, it should be clear that
without the exercise of American power, the existing liberal capitalistic world order
would eventually collapse.390
The transition from the ideological confrontation to the consensus over the model
of global economic and political management created a perfect moment and
unprecedented opportunity for the United States to take a lead and change the
international environment in the America‟s image. The fall of the Berlin Wall in late
1989 and the culmination of the confrontation between traditional East and West left the
world with illusion that the victory of liberal democratic capitalism was final.391 As a
result of the “technological revolution involving the creation of a computerized network
of communication,”392 the process of neoliberal globalization became a reality and has
given an impression that all people from all the regions of the globe have been caught up
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in a single movement and are all marching together towards the peace, prosperity and
democracy.393
D. Neoliberal Triumph in Ukraine
The essential point is that for the majority of Ukrainian politicians the country‟s
modernization and progress has been associated with Western neoliberal economic and
political framework as the only legitimate path to restructure itself after decades of the
communist rule. Since the declaration of Ukraine as an independent state, the neoliberal
ideology has been central for the ruling class.394 In fact, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, former Communist party officials and Komsomol workers quickly equipped
themselves with the knowledge of neoliberal political economy in exchange for the
legitimization of their power and authority by the Western world. 395 Furthermore, the
experience of the Soviet centrally planned developmental strategy and the desire for
individual liberty and equality before the law signified that Western political and
socioeconomic model with an emphasis on private enterprise, consumerism, market
economy and withdrawal of the state has presented an attractive picture to the
populations in Eastern Europe.396 Therefore, with the end of the ideological battle in the
context of Cold War, the idea of the development by replacing “backward” practices with
Western norms and institutions has been greeted with euphoria by the countries of
Eastern Europe.
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After the series of external shocks crested with the spectacular collapse of the
Soviet Union, the fundamental institutional change in development strategy, greater
openness to trade, and complete deregulation of the financial system have become the
essential preconditions to successful stabilization and adjustment processes in Eastern
Europe. It has been widely accepted that through economic growth and modernization in
the overwhelmingly Western-centric vision or more specifically in the American image,
social inequalities and the Soviet way of life would be eliminated. Furthermore, the
political conditionality, tied to Western financial aid which has been imposed on the
former communist countries, left little choice but to adopt the program of radical political
and socioeconomic policies associated with capitalist development and democratic, as
opposed to authoritarian, form of government.397
Consequently, it is apparent that while domestic transition dynamics of the
countries of Eastern Bloc has differed in size and intensity, the vision of Western-led
development model for such countries as Ukraine has resulted from domestic demands
and international pressures.398 Importantly, while the process of modernization within
Central and Eastern Europe has targeted not only communist political and socioeconomic
system but also the Soviet Union,399 it has deepened the problem of Ukraine‟s national
identity, and thereby has delayed a structural change in economic and sociopolitical life
of Ukrainians. Nevertheless, current Ukrainian political establishment continues to view
Western neoliberal model of development as the only legitimate path to progress, and
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gradually transforms politics and economy of the country in a top-down manner
according to the prescriptions of the Western world.
Furthermore, it is necessary to acknowledge that a part of the reason that the
nature of neoliberal reforms in Ukraine was always half-hearted is the fact that none of
the Ukrainian political forces possessed an absolute power.400 In point of fact, both Mr.
Kuchma and Mr. Yushchenko while trying to balance between the needs of big capital
and public sentiments were not able to fully implement neoliberal economic policy
reforms.401 For Yuriy Romanenko, the victory of Yanukovych in 2010 Ukrainian
presidential election marks the radical shift towards neoliberal structural policy. Having
succeeded in the allocation of maximum concentration of powers in one institution,
Yanukovych's regime, under the guise of “tough measures to restore order” has made a
commitment to neoliberalism as the dominant ideology and political stance.402
The neoliberal offensive in Ukraine which began with the advent of Yanukovych
is entirely logical in the context of achieving a non-violent solution to the political crisis
in Ukraine.403 Since Yanukovych‟s arrival happened at the time of global economic
crisis, any government‟s actions could be perceived as a necessity to protect a common
good.404 In this context, referring to Milton Friedman, Romanenko underlines that only
crisis could lead to real change in Ukraine. Specifically, through exploitation of crisis
conditions and managing opposition, Yanukovych‟s government has initiated economic
reform policies.
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As a result, Yanukovych released the program of economic reforms for 20102014 which comprehensively defines an application of neoliberal economic agenda. In
fact, the systematic reform program, which according to Ukrainian mass-media was
developed by McKinsey & Company, consists of the pension and tax reforms, reform of
the labor code and many other programs of economic reforms which have been written
on the prescription of IMF, and more important, as a precondition for IMF financial aid.
In short, this program envisages raised living standards, improved growth performance
and more transparency through complete privatization and liberalization, deregulation
and fiscal decentralization, complete reformation of public services.
NATO as a Dutiful Agent of Neoliberalism
While the IMF and World Bank have been the most powerful advocates of
neoliberal reforms in the developing world over the last three decades, NATO, WTO and
the European Central Bank joined the race to spread neoliberalism shortly after the
collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. If Central and Eastern Europe‟s
integration into the Western Alliance‟s institutional framework was recently
accomplished and consolidated, Ukraine‟s reorientation has attained an advanced stage in
the economic and political spheres.
Rachel Epstein argues that international institutions have had a significant
influence on post communist countries which have set themselves on a free market
reform trajectory.405 According to Epsein, the liberal, or as I call it neoliberal, worldview
that currently prevails in the minds of political and economic elites of Eastern and Central
405
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Europe is supported “by a perception of where authority is grounded.”406 For most parts
of Eastern and Central Europe, the transition to political pluralism and free market
enterprise “has been marked by a shift from domestic sources of authority, such as
historical experience and nationalist striving to international sources of authority, such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and the Bretton Woods
institutions.”407 Epstein‟s claim that “Domestic actors view international institutions as
authoritative sources of information and, as a consequence, seek their approbation,” is
very persuasive.408
International institutions not only exercise power over policymaking elites and
consequently determine an international orientation of states, they also influence the
“domestic balance of power among groups in society.”409 International institutions,
whose main priority is to develop new policy programs, persuade and shape the actions
of domestic actors and should be viewed as active agents of domestic and global
change.410 While I realize that a number of different theoretical approaches can be
relevant for the evaluation of the role of the state in today‟s internationalized world and
extremely useful for our understanding of how international institutions and regimes can
transform political dynamics, this section attempts only to highlight the point that
international organizations have promoted consensus around the neoliberal policy
manifestations in the countries undergoing transition. More important, the point is that
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multilateral institutions play a key role in regional and global processes of monitoring
and implementation of free market-oriented knowledge structure while disciplining
alternative knowledge, ideas, policy options, and practices.
As previously mentioned, for Ukraine, Euro-Atlantic integration means not only
being a member of collective security system, but fostering of economic development
through a neoliberal political and constitutional framework.

If for Walt, Ukraine‟s

participation in the transatlantic cooperative security arrangement can increase the state‟s
strength in relation to Russia and enhance its regional influence, according to Brett
Leed‟s and Andrew Long‟s hypothesis, Euro-Atlantic integration means more for
Ukraine than just being an associate of military organization.411 Leeds and Long assert
that military allies unconditionally have positive economic consequences, and members
of the collective security system are expected to facilitate economic growth, development
and trade.412 For scholars, the security externality and the reaction of commercial
institutions are the main motives and explanations for intensive engagement in
mercantilism. Leeds and Long conclude that “When firms feel secure that conflict
between their state and that of their trading partners is unlikely to occur and that the states
will work together to promote commerce between their respective businesses, they are
more likely to invest in trade.”413
As determined by the liberalist theoretical perspective of international relations,
Ukraine‟s membership in NATO will provide a well-balanced and secure framework for
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regional and international economic activity, and thereby will encourage close trading
relationships and reassure the international community that economic cooperation
remains safe. Namely, the liberal view with its ideas of complex interdependence and
functionalism ascribes to NATO a crucial role in driving states to collaborate in a much
more widespread way than they had done before. Liberal explanations for the
incorporation of Ukraine into NATO derive from the idea that all states are bound to
benefit from interdependency and cooperation. This argument stresses that while NATO
reduces the threat for nascent democracies and thereby promotes and extends the liberal
community, the Alliance also continues to play a security role. Liberal scholars see
NATO as one of many multilateral mechanisms to promote security and transnational
cooperation through reinforcing democracy and free market economies. In fact, my point
is that the only arguments which demonstrate security advantages for Ukraine joining
NATO seem to rely more on particular Wilsonian liberal internationalism or
constructivist notions about the constitutive role of alliances rather than realist
conventional wisdom.
According to Epstein, countries who are not even members of the Alliance yet,
but have joined the path to its membership, already demonstrate their devotion to
Western political and economic models. Through the Partnership for Peace, a program
directed at creating trust between NATO and non-members, a process of
denationalization of defense planning and foreign policy in majority of countries of
Eastern and Central Europe has already taken place. 414 Furthermore, while the
partnership commits to extend defense cooperation between a non-member state and the
414
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Alliance, it pushes a cooperative non-member state to transform power relations from an
executive-led model to a model of democratic civil-military relations.415 One of the main
focuses of NATO has always been the establishment of “a system of check and balances
in which the executive, government, parliament, and society, through the media and
nongovernmental organizations would share in oversight.”416 Moreover, particular
transformations in defense will not only lead to further distributional consequences, but
signify a transformation of “previously contested ideas into commonly held
assumptions.”417 It follows, therefore that NATO uses its membership requirements not
only to regulate the behavior of societies, but also to define new tasks, create new
categories of actors and shape social reality in ways that favor a market-oriented
approach.
Alexandra Gheciu‟s book NATO in the “New Europe” The Politics of
International Socialization After the Cold War is an analytical examination of NATO‟s
role in building of construction of Western liberal norms and practices in former
Communist states. While analyzing the practices of NATO in Eastern and Central
Europe, Gheciu argues that NATO has been deeply involved in socializing “Central and
Eastern European political, military, and functional elites into adopting Western-defined
liberal democratic norms and building corresponding institutions in their states.”418
Through NATO‟s involvement in the numerous processes of domestic politics, the
organization has “played an important role in post-Communist efforts in Central and
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Eastern Europe to (re) draw boundaries between reasonable/unacceptable definitions of
national identity and interests”419 While Gheciu unifies a great number of arguments that
are useful for my study, the claim that NATO has been deeply engaged in a relatively
broad set of activities aimed at projection of a particular kind of liberal state identity in
Central and Eastern Europe, “while simultaneously rejecting alternative norms and
institutions as inherently flawed” is important.420
E. Conclusion
In summary, it should be clear that the process of decolonization ended the
process of the extension of power though conquest and led to the major transformations
in the form of capitalist imperialism. The United States, a unique country “in the degree
of its reliance on military spending, and its determination to beside the world, military as
well as economically,”421 established not only the renewed cycle of capital accumulation,
but a new form of social control and discipline. The chapter has sought to demonstrate
that the Bretton Woods system was designed to drive states into consensus that global
economic and social development should be based around market-based principles. More
important, it should be apparent that the post-war order was organized to promote a
regime, associated with the classical liberalism, in which the notions of complex
interdependence and integration were highly suggestive in order to improve living
standards and promote rapid economic growth. This chapter also briefly examined the
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and marked it as a shift to economic globalization
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associated with the widespread implementation of the free market doctrines, known as
neoliberalism.
International institutions have become significantly necessary instruments for
maintaining international economic and political order.

Through the engagement

particularly with the liberal pluralist perspectives, I examine international institutions as
the instruments to promote the neoliberal policies of privatization, liberalization and
deregulation. My main argument here is that markets are expanded and produced with the
help of international organizations. It should be clear that international institutions, such
as NATO, IMF, WTO, and World Bank impose the limitations on socio-economic and
political life of states to promote neoliberalism as Western model of economic
development and thereby deprive of any other achievable policy alternatives.
As for Ukraine‟s membership in NATO specifically, I argue that while it has
always been a protector of capitalist liberal order, with the end of the Cold War the
Alliance has become an active and important tool in the process of post communist
transition. I agree with the viewpoint that through a series of “mechanisms of teaching
and persuasion,” NATO continues to be deeply involved in promotion of Western-style
liberal political and economic norms.422 As Gheciu concluded, NATO, “conventionally
regarded as just a military alliance, which, by definition, would not become involved in
domestic politics” should be seen as one of the leading agents in the international
socialization process aiming to shape public opinion and reconstruct domestic politics.423
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In short, the arguments taken up by Epstein and Gheciu, led me to conclude that
engagement with NATO plays a significant role in the formulation of state interests and
even definition of national identity. I argue that in close engagement with NATO, the
Western states consider domestic reforms as instruments of establishing a neoliberal
model of development in the transition countries. Logically, this means that membership
in NATO signifies a subscription to Anglo-American neoliberal economic model,
imposed by the Western World. Given this context, it is vitally necessary to think that
Ukraine‟s membership in NATO demands a resignation of Ukrainian sovereignty in the
realms of foreign and domestic policy. This discussion contributes to the argument that
an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by Ukraine‟s security
concerns, but by strong Western interests, especially economic.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The significant part of Ukraine‟s identity problem emerged out of its historical
context. Historically, eastern and southern parts of Ukraine were under the Russian
empire and western Ukraine at times was a part of Austro-Hungarian Empire,
Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Poland. More important, Ukrainians lived not only in
various political entities, but also in very different cultural systems which developed on
the basis of Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches. While eastern Ukrainians
speak Russian, the people of western Ukraine, on the other hand, speak Ukrainian. Only
after World War II, with the end of prolonged conflict between western Ukrainians and
Poles, Ukraine established its present-day borders as a republic within the Soviet Union.
In 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence there were predictions that Ukraine
would break up the way of Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, while being
hardly a well-integrated country, Ukraine continues its existence as an independent and
unexpected state that many are still adjusting to.424
Ukraine is not strictly speaking a national state. Rather it is a unique multinational
and multicultural state in which the Russian presence has been extremely large.
Previously oppressed different cultural traditions “entered the conceptual space of
identity debate” and created an equilibrium which implies the absence of unilateral
colonial pressure.425 For some it may be an exaggeration, but I am suggesting that
Ukrainian state serves as a good example of the artificially constructed state consisting of
424
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different peoples whose integration into one political group emerged rather recently.
Thus, the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state resulted in the underlying dispute
over the question of what it means to be Ukrainian.
The search for a Ukrainian identity rests on a conflict between the eastern cultural
tradition, which attaches values of the connection between Russians and Ukrainians, and
western cultural tradition, which privileges Ukraine‟s Western identity. In the debate over
cultural affiliation of Ukraine it does not matter which of these cultures are better. The
problem is that Western and Eurasian political cultures are different and not compatible.
Following Jeffrey Hahn, I am referring political culture to the values, beliefs, and
attitudes about political life which society holds and which, through “an intergenerational
transfer known as the process of political socialization,” constitute an integral part of
person‟s social identity.426 In fact, it is necessary to emphasize that the notion of
“Eurasia” in this work is not referred to the assembly of the continents of Europe and
Asia, but as Dmitri Trenin notes, it is addressed to the “traditional Russian state - the
stardom of Muscovy, the empire, the Soviet Union.”427 To explore this issue further,
Molchanov makes it clear that “Eurasianism emphasizes the conservative side of Russian
political culture, elevating the state over society and defending impersonal „order‟ against
the „anarchic‟ impulses of individual freedom.”428 Arguing for the pro-Eurasian ideology
of Ukraine‟s foreign policy, its proponents are clear that such a political culture is
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contradictory to a kind of “liberalism” and “democracy” that Western political culture
advances.
Although the debate over Ukraine‟s integration in NATO covers mainly such
issues as the enhancement of state security, modernization of armed forces, and
improvement of military performance, NATO membership for Ukraine is a part of the
process of nurturing Ukraine‟s Western self-conception and demonstrates Ukraine‟s
commitment to the process of integration into Western institutions. According to Paul
D‟Anieri, “even if Ukraine is never admitted to NATO but establishes NATO
membership as a goal, then something new has been said about Ukrainian national
identity.”429 In fact, the issue of Ukraine‟s integration into NATO for the majority of
Ukrainian population involves not the point of a return to Europe or Western civilization,
but a matter of changing dimensions of Ukrainian society along the structure of
civilization.

Therefore, it should be clear that NATO is playing a crucial role in

influencing Ukrainian political culture and political environment.
Pro-NATO forces in Ukraine have portrayed the Alliance mostly in military
terms, and argued that strengthening of Ukraine‟s position vis-à-vis Russia and protection
against a possible Russian threat is the main value of NATO membership for Ukraine. I
have argued that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member is not driven by
Ukraine‟s security concerns. Obviously, Ukrainian society has had a long history of
Soviet rule and domination. Russian influence on Ukraine has always been evident.
However, I assert that most of political, economic and cultural tensions between Ukraine
and Russia are artificial and in most cases mean to mobilize certain fractions of electorate
429
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and to discredit the political opponents. While I acknowledge that “the Ukrainian-Russian
cultural war is part of a wider on-going undeclared conflict between both countries over
their evolving national identities,” it must be clear that the disputes and differences over
national identity have always been chronically used in Ukraine‟s elections at all levels. 430
It is also true that Russia used its energy resources to influence Ukrainian policies. 431
However, as Anton Fedyashin argues, “Since Russia has subsidized Ukraine's economy
by selling it gas below market prices, it was well within its rights to expect cooperation in
return.”432 With regard to Ukraine‟s pro-Western course, it is interesting to note that
“Russia has never objected to Ukraine's participation in the EU, the OECD, or any other
non-military Western institution.”433 This is probably because prospect of Ukraine
actually joining these Western institutions has remained a long way off.
The question of Ukrainian membership in NATO has always been influenced by
historical and ideological factors which in recent years have become the main electoral
motivations of the Ukrainian highly polarized society.434 Unfortunately, following the
election of Yushchenko, the problems only intensified and manipulation of public
opinion has became a live issue as never before. Clearly, Yushchenko reduced Ukraine‟s
Western orientation to NATO membership and depicted his anti-Russian policy as the
expression of Ukrainian patriotism.435 In the absence of Russian threat and due to the lack
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of spectacularity of Ukrainian-Russian antagonism the security approach was determined
for a failure as a conceivable reason for Ukraine‟s incorporation in the military Alliance.
Therefore, the perception of a Russian threat served to be the central argumentative
strategy of the former Ukrainian government to bring Ukraine into NATO.
Nevertheless, while in the public sphere the balance-of-threat served a largely
convincing explanation for Ukraine to be incorporated into NATO, in practice the
security concerns have resulted to be nothing else than a part of rhetorical action to
persuade the opponents of Ukraine‟s incorporation in NATO. Active pulling of Ukraine
into NATO, grounded on security concerns and motivated by the fear of the enemy,
brought the opposite effects which seem to be neither overlooked by the former U.S.
leadership nor by the former Ukrainian president. Once again, this happened because of
the neorealist argumentative strategy of Yushchenko that was completely different from
the rhetorical strategy of the leaders of Central and Eastern European states who along
with security concerns appealed to the Western liberal principles of social and political
order. Relying on Schimmelfennig‟s analysis it is clear that the perception of security
threat is not a legitimizing foundation to be incorporated into the military alliance such as
NATO.436
Furthermore, identification with the Western international community and the
perception of liberal democratic norms as legitimate are sufficient preconditions for
NATO's decision to admit new members.437 While Central and Eastern European states
have always identified themselves positively with Western international community,
436
437
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perceived Western liberal norms as legitimate and eventually integrated into NATO and
the European Union, for such countries as Ukraine positive identification with the
Western community is not enough. The process of integration into NATO or the
European Union requires the transformation of Ukrainian identity in turn which is
problematic for both Ukraine and Russia. Attempts to speedily shift the construction of
Ukrainian identity in the pro-Western direction during the presidency of Yushchenko
have significantly contributed to the political instability and further division in Ukrainian
society.
Therefore, the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO while excluding Russia would
decrease rather than increase not only Ukraine‟s security, but also Europe‟s security.
With Ukraine‟s incorporation into military alliance , the great danger is that Russia will
be trapped in a security dilemma what in its turn will force Russian policymakers to
adopt more hostile attitude not only towards Ukraine, but also towards organization in
general. Russia would have every reason to view Ukraine‟s incorporation into NATO as a
threat, especially given the geographical position of its Black Sea Fleet. In these
circumstances, it is apparent that an effort to turn Ukraine into North-Atlantic military
ally would lead to potentially negative consequences in Europe and beyond. Moreover,
the Crimean question would never go away just because Ukraine joins NATO.
Consequently, the conclusion that an attempt to turn Ukraine into NATO member
is not driven by Ukraine‟s security concerns flows logically. NATO is the organization of
the Western community which pursues a strategy of transforming the values, rules and
norms of the Western neoliberal capitalism into “domestic institutions and discourses that
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effectively

govern

domestic

and

foreign

policy-making.”438

Seen

from

Schimmelfenning‟s perspective, membership in NATO signifies the affirmation of a
Western political and socio-economic model against competing alternatives in both
domestic and international arena.439
I have argued that the extension of NATO should be seen as an extension of
multiple forms of power and influence, and the issue of Ukraine joining Euro-Atlantic
Alliance should be examined in the context of the U.S. strategic interests. If states,
according to realists, are considered to be the only entities in the system of international
relations, then it is obvious that NATO should be examined as a tool for advancing of
agent‟s state interests. Why is it in the interests of the U.S. to contribute huge proportions
of resources to group undertaking and back NATO‟s membership for the weak and
unstable states?440 This work contributes to the idea that NATO should be seen as
multilateral organization which reinforces and promotes a global governance system,
aiming at the establishment and consolidation of capitalist international order under the
supervision of the United States. Taking the argument a step further, being a multilateral
organization, NATO‟s norms and rules have been applied to reinforce the process of
transnational class formation, linked to globalized patterns of production and distribution,
which in its turn are tied to the interests of U.S. corporations.
It has been argued that in the second half of the twentieth century the world
capitalism entered the new phase of accumulating wealth and power in which
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international organizations have played a significant role in support for the needs of the
capitalist mode of production. Except until the Second World War, the United States has
considered itself to be the heir to Western civilization with the responsibility for
defending the West against the enemies.441 Following the end of the Second World War,
Western imperialist camp, guided by the United States, became the decisive force in the
system of international relations. The highest priority of the U.S. political establishment
has become to reform the manufacturing, business and commercial world along lines that
would absorb U.S. manufacturing surpluses and offer opportunities for investment.442 A
new world order, constructed through such institutions as the United Nations, the IMF,
the World Bank, was to be subordinated to the needs of the U.S. economy and subjected
to U.S. political control.
In contrast to the common view that is constructed on the concepts of rhetoric, the
United States‟ foreign policy originated directly from domestic policy and its main goal
has always been to center commercial interests.443 The domestic market of the United
States required constant economic growth, with rising profits and full employment,
required investment abroad and growth of trade.444 As a result, “the finance oligarchy
involved the state in national economic planning and implicated it in the process of
economic and military competition with the dominant classes of other societies.”445 State
monopoly capitalism that replaced laissez-faire state has started to use its power to force
441
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weaker states to allow entry of its goods into their markets, and has forced states to
accept unfavorable terms of trade.446 The struggle for monopoly power has become the
dynamic principle in the U.S. foreign policy.447
The existence of the Soviet threat helped to unite capitalist powers into the U.S.led military alliance, and thereby enforced U.S. hegemony.448 Security became the excuse
for Europe, Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand to agree to military and
economic integration with the United States.449 This point gives rise to the claim that the
supremacy in the security structure is most significant to the supporting of capitalist
hegemony.450 Gill is clear that while we can speak of Australia, Japan or Europe as major
economic challengers, their dependence on the United States for their security signifies
that those actors are subordinated.451 Here I join Lipschutz, who comments that “for the
United States in particular, the importance of the Soviet Bloc lay in its real or imagined
threat to Western capitalism as a system.”452 The confrontation between two superpowers
has allowed the United States in a relatively short period of time to plan a global military
strategy, “dividing the planet into regions and allocating the responsibility for the control
of each of them to a U.S. Military command.”453 It follows from this that the main goal of
the U.S. military agenda has been to maintain the U.S. hegemony, act as the police
officer, and make sure that there would not appear a player in the system of international
relations that can challenge U.S. militarily and economically.
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In fact, according to Aleksandr Dugin, we are dealing with a new form of
Westernization, that in different ways “passed by Roman Empire, Medieval Christianity,
the Modernity (with the Enlightenment and colonization) and up to present day
postmodernism and ultra-individualism.” The bad news is that the historical existence of
the U.S. goes simultaneously with the course of the human history, and the gap between
the devotion to the promotion of justice and the reality of the U.S. foreign policy
objectives is tremendous.454 As Andrew Bacevich correctly points out, “From the earliest
days of the Cold War the United States entertained a strategic vision that looked well
beyond the imperative of defending the world against communist aggression.”455 My
point is that the promotion of neoliberalism has initially been in the U.S. interests and has
had nothing to do with global social justice and economic growth.
From Wallerstein‟s analysis it is clear not only that the concept of state is
constructed to perform a number of roles which are vital for a capitalist economic
growth, but more important for my argument is the notion that the economic structure of
capitalism for its successful functioning requires the existence of dominant ideologies or
belief systems. Namely the “crisis in state-led development in the Third World and the
discrediting of the Soviet-based left” led to the extraordinary degree of global consensus
over the adoption of free market-oriented reforms, promoted by the global institutions
and the most powerful state actors.456 However, the claims of the experts of international
institutions that everyone would benefit from the model of export-oriented manufacturing

454

Dugin, “Global Transition and its Enemies.”
Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, 6.
456
Green and Griffith, “Globalization and Its Discontents,”52.
455

149

are incontrovertibly false. Unfortunately, the global community with its naivety has been
caught in trap.457
That very process of globalization with its pop-culture, technological innovation
and consumerism which jointly have contributed to the feeling of constant development
and progress distracted people from understanding the true nature of exploitation and
oppression that the majority of the world‟s population has been experiencing. As George
puts it, “Rather than encompassing everyone in a collective march towards a better life,
globalization is a process that allows the world market economy to take the best and
leave the rest.”458 Nowadays, subordination of social groups in capitalist globalized world
is based on the extraction of consent which implies the global spread of consumerist
culture and power of democracy. A point that has to be kept in mind is that these are the
instruments by which bourgeoisie ruling class maintains its capitalist hegemony. I am
convinced that the key to understanding and appreciation of globalization is to
conceptually keep the globalization as a “politico-economic project” distinct from
globalization as a “techno-cultural process.”459 While globalization entails both capitalist
markets and flows of technology, people, ideas and culture “across national boundaries
via a global networked society,”460 it represents itself as a counterpart of the U.S. foreign
policy which is either economic policy or consists of instructing the world in American
virtues.

457

George, “Globalizing Rights?” 16.
Ibid.
459
Adopted from Booth, Theory of World Security, 361.
See also Kellner, “Theorizing Globalization,”285-286.
460
Kellner, “Theorizing Globalization,”287.
458

150

According to modernization theory, societal development and economic growth
of the newly established states such as Ukraine or Slovenia should take place through the
application of neoliberal economic mechanisms and democratic consolidation. While the
postwar planners designed national and international economic order on the basis of the
ideas of John Keynes, who argued for state interference in the economy and provision of
goods and services to a national population, current political and economic establishment
is pushing for a neoliberalism as a new liberal orthodoxy associated with the marketdriven approach based on classical liberal policies and favoring a minimal role of the
state.

Thus, if during the 1960‟s the development doctrine was dominated by the

conception of economic ideology centered on the important role of both the government
and market, in the present years the political economy of modernization approach has
relied heavily on the role of international institutions and free market as an engine of
development and progress.461 To estimate the radical change in political and economic
thought, George makes it clear that if in 1945 or 1950 someone had proposed that the
government should diminish its role in the economy or that society should be given much
less than social protection, he or she would have been called insane.462
Today, markets are seen to be a better way of organizing not only an economic
activity, but are tightly linked to a policy of social and political arrangement. More
important, the neoliberal view of development, based on economic growth through free
market economies and free trade, has supplanted all other prospects for economic
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practice and continues to deprive any other regional alternatives toward development
policies.463As Arturo Escobar writes, “The total opening of the economy – coupled with a
new round of privatization of the state - has become the order of the day.”464 In fact, any
political and economic activity that might interact with liberalization of trade and finance,
privatization and deregulation is automatically questionable and causes suspicion because
it seems to interact with the mechanisms of the free market, which is seen as the most
efficient and only rationale, fair and democratic instrument of organizing human
production and exchange.465
As culture along with ideology advance from the national to the international
levels, they become institutionalized in organizations such as NATO.466 If after the
breakup of the Soviet Union, discussions in the 1990s often rotated around “whether
NATO would, could or should survive, they now centre around the implications of its
centrality, and its current and future enlargement.”467 The questions of how and why the
military alliance survived after the end of the Cold War directs attention of the scholars to
the redefinition of NATO‟s traditional mission and purpose. The extension of the zone of
NATO eastward has been viewed from the standpoint of geopolitical interests and should
be regarded as an ideological measure. If it was not so why then the integration of Russia
463
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into a Western concert had not occurred and how the NATO expansion into East-Central
Europe, despite the agreement between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990
against the enlargement of NATO, can be explained.468
I have demonstrated that NATO should be viewed not as a measure to maintain
regional stability, but as an instrument to promote a hegemonic neoliberal hegemony. The
argument I developed above considers neoliberalism as a modernization project of the
capitalist elites, based on the exercise of global power and directed by the imperatives of
the international accumulation of capital.469 Therefore, NATO is one of the numerous
transnational social forces working to maintain the essentials of the global system of
capitalism through transforming Central and East European societies. Finally, Ukrainian
membership in NATO will signify the consolidation hegemonic ideology in Ukraine.
I argue that Ukraine, being situated in the zone between West and East, should not
rely on NATO to guarantee its state security, in particular at the expense of UkraineRussia relationship. Furthermore, I consider the idea that NATO cannot maintain its
status of collective security arrangement unless the role of the European Union and
Russia in the European security arrangement is equal to the role of the United States, and
“unless it admits virtually all European nations – which would make it nearly congruent
with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.”470 However, while
examining NATO in the context of the Western extension of power, I argue that Ukraine
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should be a non-aligned state, and its geographical position provides a special advantage
for Ukraine to develop itself as a powerful regional player.
In this work, I underline the importance of the government of Ukraine to conduct
both domestic and foreign policies in the interest of the citizens of the country. I appeal
not to look for the ways to raise the standards of people‟s lives according to Russian or
Western prescriptions, but to follow the pragmatic, open-minded and independent
political course to serve the development of a self-disciplined and socially integrated
individual.
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